Would Re-Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump-Prime the Economy and Could U.S. Gambling Facilities Be Transformed into Educational and High-Tech Facilities?: Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling Companies' Secrets Confirm Research Issues? by Kindt, John Warren

Would Re-Criminalizing U.S. Gambling 
Pump-Prime the Economy and 
Could U.S. Gambling Facilities Be 
Transformed into Educational and 
High-Tech Facilities? 
Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling 
Companies' Secrets Confirm Research 
Issues? 
John Warren Kindt' 
It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can 
even fool some of the people all the time; but you can' t fool all of the 
people all the time. 
- Abraham Lincoln I 
Introduction 
A. Background: A Case Study of Nebraska and lts Implications 
By 1990, Abraham Lincoln's wo rds about foo ling the public were regularly 
being quoted. as off-tTack betting parlors and riverboat casinos forced themselves 
into Illinois without the consen t o r a vote of the public.2 
. Professor, University of Illinois. A.B. (William and Ma ry); J.D., MBA (University of 
Georgia); LLM., SID, (Unh:ersity of Virginia). Ashleigh Jurkoshek and Susan Ksiazek 
provided va luable assistance in updating. editing, and cit\..··dw .. 'Cking this article. TI\e 
author/ed itors attempted to delete references and source materials too heavily influenCl!d by 
pro-gambling interests or other special interests unless idt..'I,tifi<..-d as such. For an analysis of 
publk concerns in these issue areas, see Jolm W. Kindt, nlc Costs of Ad(/iclcd Gamblcrs: Should 
the Stutes ImHute Mega-LawslIits Similar to lile Tobacco CU5CS?, 22 MA. ..... AGER.lAL & DEasrON EcoN. 
17, 19-21. 27-28, 31-32 (2001). Corrt..'Spomlcnce to: University of Illinois, C hampa ign, IL 61820, 
USA. Tel: (217) 333-6018; fax: (217) 244-7969. 
I President Abraham Lincoln , To a caller at the White Hou5(', i/l Mo1'..'EY TALKS: THE 
2500 CREAmrrBt.."SIl\'E$Q\Jan;sFROM ArusronEmDELoREAN 156 (RobertW. Kented . 1985). 
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Economists and sociologists noted that the economic justifications for 
decriminalized gambling such as claims of new jobs, public revenues, and business 
development were the same types of arguments that Lincoln decried as being 
utilized to justify slavery in the 1800s,3 and which could still be utilized to justify 
decriminalizing illegal drugs in the present era. In other words, during the 1990s the 
quasi-econornic arguments of pro-gambling interests were without credible 
documentation4 and were severely criticizeds-even after the Washington-based 
lobbying group for the gambling industry financed hvo Arthur Andersen reports in 
the mid-1990s to give the gambling interests some credibility.6 
By comparison, in the rnid-l990s, the Nebraska legislature was approached 
by lobbyists fOT the ailing Aksarben7 racetrack that wanted to save itself by 
transforming into a combination racetrack-casino or "racino."s Instead of allowing a 
casino to drain assets from the consumer economy, the legislature de facto closed the 
racetTack and transformed the racetrack's existing resources (combined with new 
financial assistance) into a high-tech office park with associated faCilities/classrooms 
for the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO). 
2 After the Illinois lottery was approved in the late 197Qs, the voters of Illinois had no 
statewide votes on the continued expansion of gambling facilities within the state. However, 
a senes of "nonbinding" referenda in various Illinois cities and COlUlties during the 1990s 
made it quite evident that two-thirds of the state's voters were against legalized gambling 
activities and their expansion. Due to continued adverse public and voter opinion, expansion 
of legalized gambling activities in Illinois bypassed any binding statewide vote and was 
accomplished via legislation promoted by pro-gambling lobbyists. For a table of Illinois 
"nonbinding" votes during the 19905, see A,J.'lITA BEDELL, ILL. OIURQI ACTION ON ALCOHffi 
PROBLE."IS, GAMBl.l.'<G RiGHr TO VOTE REf'EREt..'Dll1fS IN ILllNOiS AND ILLL,<OlS ~'\'DUl>IS ON 
SPEaFIC GMffiLING PRoPOSALS, tbls. (1997). 
3 See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOUl, 5PEEa-IEs AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 1, 40 (Don 
Fehrenbacher ed. 1989) [hereinafter LINCOLN]; see also id. at 132-50 (Lincoln Speech at NeVi 
Haven. Conn., Mar. 6, 1860); id. at 31-58 (Lincoln Speech at Columbus, Ohio, Sept 16, 1859). 
4 For the definitive analysis on the L-Kk of credibility exhibited by studies by 
pro-gambling interests, see ROB£RT G::oDMAN. LEGALIZED GAII18LL'IG AS A STRATEGY fOR 
EcONG:.UC DEVELOPMENT (Ctr. for &:on. Dev., Univ. of Mass. at Amherst, 1994) [hereinafter 
CED REPORT]. For a comparison of disparities and the concomitant impeachment of studies 
financed by pro-gambling interests, see John W. Kindt, The Ecol/omic Impacts Of ugalized 
Gamblil1g AcHvities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51 (1994) [hereinafter ECOllomic Impacts]_ For updated 
tables on the socio-e.:onomic costs of gambling activities, see John W. Kindt, TI,e Costs of 
Addicted Gamblers: Sirouid tire States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to tire Tobacco Cnses?, 22 
MANAGERiAL & DEasroN EcoN. 17 (2001) rhereinafter Mega-Lawsuits}. 
5 See generally sources cited supra note 4. 
6 ARTHUR AI\'DERSE)·.J, EcONOl'-l1C hWACfS OF CASINO GA/o,lING IN THE UNITED STATES, 
VOLUllffi 1: MAa.oSTUDv (Dec. 1996) (prepared fo r the Am. Gaming Ass'n., Lobbying Group) 
[hereinafter AM. GAl'-l1NG A$N./ M'DERSEN MACRO STUDY]; ARTHUR ANDERSEN, Eco"'G:.IIC 
IMPActS OF CASINO GAMING IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLl)ME 2: MICRO STUDY (May 1997) 
(prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n., Lobbying Group) [hereinafter Al>1. G.4.."iL'IG 
Ass'N'; ANDERsE."l" U IO<OSTUDvl. 
7 Aksarben is "Nebraska" spelk-'rl backwards. 
8 Matthew Waite, Legislahm Likely to Approve FlIllds for UNO, FDR, DAILyNEBRASKAl'l, 
Jan. 1997 [hereinafter Waite]. 
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Beginning in 1997, the Nebraska legislature cleared the way for First Data 
Resou rces (mR) "to build an office complex, which. [was predicted to] create 
2000 new jobs over ... five years."9 This project was adjacent to a new UNO College 
of Infannation Sciences and Technology. The $37.4 million new college facility was 
"called one of the most significant in the city's history by Omaha Mayor Hal Daub 
and 1\.11) [Nebraska University] President Dennis Smith,"10 Thus, instead of draining 
the Omaha economy via govemment-sanctioned casinos,!! the N ebraska legislature 
in the short term pump-primed the consumer econom y and in the long term 
educated the public and promoted high-tech entrepreneurship. 
Thereafter, as pro-gambling interests returned to Nebraska, they were 
repeatedly rebuffed by the academic community, which was exemplified in one 
instance by 40 economists publicly rejecting new gambling proposals that would 
"carmibalize" the consume r economy.12 
Similarly, suggestions have been made to re-(:fiminalize gambling facilities 
in other s tates and transform the gambling facilities into educational and high-tech 
assetsB - instead of giving the gambling ind ustry tax breaks -like the $40 billion 
federal tax break given to gambling companiesl4 as pa rt of the 2002 &onomic 
Stimulus Bill.15 Casinos and gambling parlors would generally be compatible with 
transformations into educational and high-tech resources. For example, the hotels 
and dining facilities could be natu ral d ormitory fac ilities. Historically, facilities built 
for short-term events, such as various World's Fair Expositions, the 1996 Olympic 
Village (converted to facilities for the Georgia University system), and other public 
events have been transfo rmed into educational and research fac ilities.!b 
9 (d. 
10 Id. 
11 Robert Dorr, 40 Ea!llomis/s Side Agains/ More Gamblillg, Sigllers: Costs Likely Higher 
tflall Profits, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept 22, 1996, at 18. 
121d. 
13 SOT, e.g .. Garrison Wells, CasillO Foes Hear Call 10 Stop AJi Gambli llg, GRAND RAPfcs 
PRr:ss(Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sep t. 17,2001, at 01. 
H Tony Batt Tax Breakfor Slots OK'd, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Oct. 16, 2001 [hereinafter Tax 
Break for SI0/51· 
15 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2ClO2. Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 
(2002). See gellCTally John W. Kindt & John K. Pakhak, Lrgali:ed Gambling's Destamli:ation of 
u.s. Fit/anaa! II1Stihlfiolls and the Banking Industry: 15sues ill Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm 
Produchmr, 19 EMORY U. BAN"KR DEv. J. 21 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling's Destabilization of 
Fil1al1dall 'IStitUtiOllsj. 
1b See also VVaite, supra note 8. 
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Given the allegations of misuse, non.accounting. and even malfeasance 
involving gambling revenues in Native American operations,17 various Us. 
Congressional personnel in the late 1990s considered potentialiegislation that would 
place Native American gambling revenues in trust for the benefit of all Native 
Americans, not just a few senior tribe members. This policy was to be combined 
with the partial use of trust monies to conve rt Native American gambling facilities 
into educational, cultural, and business facilities.18 
B. Reasons for Re-Criminalizing U.S. Gambling: Crime, Corruption, and Poverty 
As the 21st century began, US. Congressional support continued to increase 
fo r the proposal to transform Native American gambling facilities into educational 
and high-tech institutions financed la rgely by trust monies fTOm all Native American 
gambling as that gambling was to be phased out over a period of three to 
five years.19 The U.s. Congress could also establish federal jurisdiction over all 
licensed gambling activities, s imilar to the federal jurisdiction over the nuclear 
energy industry. This trend to transform Native American gambling facilities gained 
momentum from numerous reports. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), for 
example, had "certified" Native Americans such as those claiming to be Pequots 
(owning the largest casino in the world), but the Bureau apparently could not really 
substantiate that they were Native Americans.20 Subsequent claims were made in 
2001 of systemic and inappropriate (and perhaps even corrupted) decision-making at 
17 For a historical summary of issues, see Bruce OrwalL Gaming the System: nit: Federal 
Regllwtor of Indian Gambling is Also ParI Advocate, WALL ST. J .. July 22. 1996, at Al [hereinafter 
OrwalI]. For concerns by the 1999 US. National Gambling lmpactStudy Commission. see, for 
example, NATl GA.\UnlNG IMPACT STUDY CoMM'N, FINAL REroRT 7-9 Uune 1999) [hereinafter 
NGISC F[:-JAL REPoRT]. "Again, the unwillingness of individual tribes, as well as that of the 
Nationallndian Gaming Association (the tribes' lobbyists) and the Nationallndi.'Ul Gaming 
Commission (the federal agency that regulates tribal gambling), to provide infolUlation to this 
Commission, after repeated requests and assurances of confidentiali ty, limited our 
assessment. ... " Id. With only one dissenting vote by Commissioner Robert W. Loesher who 
was unduly protecting Native American gambling interests, the 1999 U.S. National Gambling 
Impact Shldy Commission voted eight to one to subpoena infonnation from the US. National 
Indian Gaming Commission in 1999. However, use of its subpoena power was thereafter 
deemed largely ineffectual by the Commission and was not pursued. Federal Gambling 
Commission Wants to See Records, GAMING MAG., Feb. 13, 1999, atl [hereinafter Commission 
Wallts Records]; Tony Batt, Gambling Panel Favors New Casino Moratorium, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., 
Apr. 29, 1999 [hereinafter Gamblilzg Moratorium]. 
18 See generally NGISC FINAL REPoRT, Silpra note 17, ch. 6. 
191d. 
20 Casino Heretic, WALL ST. L JWlC 24, 2002. at A16 [hereinafter Casino Heretic]; see 
William G. Flanagan & 'ames Samuelson, nu: Nnv Bllffalo- Bill IA/llo Got tlu: Meal?, FORBES, 
Sept. 8, 1997, at 148 {hereinafter FhUlagrul & Samuelson]. See genera lly KIM 1. E1.sL.ER, REvE,"JGE 
OFlHE P EQl101S (2001). 
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the BlA,21 resulting in the policy question: "Were senior Bureau of Indian Affairs 
officials acting as figureheads fOT powerful political and financial interests?,,22 In 
addition, the Office of the Inspector General reported in 1993 to the U.s. Department 
of the Interior (DOl) that 32 percent of Native American gambling operations were 
being conducted in violation of federal statutesjregulationsP Thereafter, the 
National Indian Gaming Commission (NTGC) arguably suppressed numbers that 
indicated in November 1996 that 84 percent of N ative American gambling facilities 
were openly operating illegally or in violation of federal stahltesjreguIations.24. 
Other reports suggested that there were mOTe than just isolated instances of crime 
and corruption caused by Native American gambling activities25 -with parallel 
scandals, such as the scandal tainting the career of U.S. Secretary of the Interior 
Bruce Babbitt, who was eventually exonerated.2/; 
Furthermore, the implicit goals of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act27 
(IGRA) to enhance the lives of all Native Americans were not being realized, as the 
large majority of N ative Americans remained in grinding poverty as the 21st century 
began.28 Accordingly, policymakers have suggested that future legislation should 
not disproportionately enrich isolated tribes. Instead, Native American gambling 
should operate for the benefit of all Native Americans, if not all of the us. public. 
This could be achieved via federal administration of a Gambling Proceeds Trust 
Fund financed by Native American gambling operations while they are phased out 
to become educational and tec.lU1ological operations. 
21 See Mkah Morrison, EI Dorado af Last: Tire CasillO Boom, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2001, at 
A18 (hereinafter Morrison]. 
22 Id. 
23 OvF!CE OF mE INSP'OClOR GENERAL, U.s. DEP'T Of INTERlOR, AUDrr REPoRT: IssuEs 
l\U',\CUNG l~fPLEMB'lTATION O F THE !.NOlAN GAMING REcULA10RY Acr (1993) [hereinafter AUDIT 
REPoRT] . 
Z; NATL INDIAN GAMING CoMJ..l'N, REFoRT 10 THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ON 
CO.\IPUANCE WITH TIffi INDIAN GAML"IG REGuLA"TORY Acr (Nov. 1996). A salient executive 
summary of the most revealing and relevant numbers was not provided. Readers of this 
report were compelled to add the numbers themselves to determine the wide-ranging scope of 
the violations. rd. 
25 See, e.g., CRI"nNAL DIv., U.S. IJEp'TOF JUSTICE. REPoRT OF TIm EXECU'IlVECoMMlTTEE 
FORlNoIANCOIDITRYLAWE'IFORCEMEln·IMPROVEMEI\'TS(l997); Chiefs Blllflr for Seminole Nation, 
NID\'S-GAZ£lTE (Chrunpaign, IIl.), May 11, 2002, at A3. 
26 See Morrison, 511pm note 21, at A18; Babbitt Exonrmfed Affer 19-Mollth Probe of 
Wisconsin Ca5irw Permit, 0-11. TRrn., Oct. 14, 1999, §1, at6. 
v 25 USc. §§ 2701-2721 (1988). 
28 XC, e.g., U.S. GEJ'..'ERAL ACCOUNTlNG OrnCE, INDIAN PRCCRAMS: TRiBAL PRiORITY 
ALLOCATIONS Do NOT T,\RGET THE NEEDIEST TRIBES 1 (1998); Flanagan & Samuelson, sllpra 
note 20, at 148-51; see also WILUAM THO~1PSON, RiCARDO G AZEL & DAN RiCKMAN, THE 
EcoNOMIC IMP,\Cf OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING IN WISCOl\'SlN (Wis. pory Res. lost, 1995) 
[hereinafter WIS. PoL'y REs. !NSf.J. See gmerally NGISC FL"IAL REPoRT, supra note 17, ch. 6. 
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In 2000 it was reported that "[d]espite an explosion of Indian gambling 
revenues-from $100 million in 1988 to $8.26 billion a decade later [l99B]-an 
Associated Press [AP] computer analysis of federal unemployment, poverty and 
public-assistance records indicates the majority of American Indians have benefited 
1ittJe."~ Between 1988 and 1998 "poverty and unemployment rates changed little"w, 
as exemplified by the Fort Mojave indian Reservation, where despite two casinos, 
the N ative American "unemployment rate climbed from 27.2 percent in 1991 to 
74.2 percent in 1997,"31 This development was attributed to the fact that "among the 
130 tribes with casinos, a few near major population centers have thrived while most 
others make just enough to cover the bills."32 In addition, any "new jobs [created by 
the Indian gambling facilities] have not reduced unemployment for Indians."33 
According to the National Indian Gaming Association, the lack of net new jobs for 
Indians was because "75 percent of jobs in tribal casinos are held by non-lndians.">l 
Unexpectedly, the 55 tribes with casinos before 1992 had their 1991 unemployment 
rate of 54 percent even increase somewhat to 54.4 percent by 1997.305 
These situations were exacerbated by illusory accounting standards that 
resulted in some tribal members with exorbitant wealth while most Native 
Americans remained disenfranchised.36 The tribes also claimed to have sovereign 
immunity from general federal statutes like those involving labor rules, sexual 
harassment, equal employment opportunity, and tortious acts.37 As reported in the 
Wall Street Journal and as most disconcerting to Congressional leaders were the 
indications involving alleged organized crime activities.38 The concerns among the 
US. Representatives were exemplified by Representative Chris Shays (R-Conn.) and 
Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.) who highlighted in a letter to President Clinton 
29 David Pace, CasillO Boom a Bust for Most Members of Indial! Tribes, NEW>-GAZEITE 
(Champaign, IlL), Sept. 2, 2000, at At rhereinafrer CasillO Bust]. 
:JO [d. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
Jj ld. 
34ld. 
35 Id; see also NGISC FmAL REPoRT, supra note 17, ch. 6. For an extensive investigative 
report highlighting the problems of Native American gambling activities, see Don.1.ld L. 
Bartlett & James B. Steele, Look Who's Cashing [,j AI llU/ian Cashros: WlIed of Misforhwe, TIME, 
Occ.14, 2002, at44 (cover story) . 
.:l6 See genemlly FL"lIlagan &. Samuelson, supra note 20, at 148-51; Joel Millman, Indian 
Casirws Win By Partly Aooidiflg Costly Labor Rules, WALL ST. L May 7,2002, a t Al [hereinafter 
J/ldil/II Casinos Labor Rules); Morrison, supra note 21, at A1S. 
r, Sl'e, e.g., Indiau Casinos Labor Rules. supra note 36, at Al. 
3Il Morrison, supra note 21, at AlB. 
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that the "influence of organized crime on lndian gambling is alarming."39 For 
example, as early as 1994 a reputed Gambino crime family associate convicted on 
drug-conspiracy, racketeering, and gambling charges "was caught on security 
surveillance tapes with [John A. "Junior"l Colli and a handful of other reputed 
Gambinos at the Foxwoods [Indian] Casino,"t{) but the Indian casino arguably had 
no duty to report such activities to federal authorities. 
As the 20th century drew to a close, former FBI agent Jim Elroy, who 
conducted background work for a U.s. Senate investigation, summarized for the 
national press the growing problems in Native American gambling operations. 
There are illegal acts going on in every single one of them [Native 
American casinos]. The Indians are getting nothing out of it. 
Meaning the ... now I'm not talking about the Indian leadership, 
they do fine. They get their pockets full and the mob gets their 
pockets full but the Indian people are getting the shaft.41 
Joseph Johnson of the FBI concluded that the "[s]pectacuJar expansion of Indian 
gaming enterprises has created a natural target for organized crime figures and their 
henchman."42 In one example, "[i]n 1998 the government announced that 16 more 
members of the mob had been convicted of felony offenses for trying to take over the 
[Rican Indian] reservation's gambling operations."H 
In another problematic scenario, in 1998 the "Salt River Pima-Maricopa 
Indian Community acknowledged it ... (was] employing felons" fOT its gambling 
facilities but argued "all of them [the felons] were screened and approved by the 
National Indian Gaming Comrnission"44 -the federal regulatory group that has been 
castigated by the national press for various improprieties.45 The Arizona state 
gaming director charged with the oversight of the Salt River tribe's gambling 
3\1 /d.; see als<J Oversight Hearing on tire lmplementation of tire lndian Gambling Regulatory 
Act: Hearing Befare tire 5. Comm. OJI Indian Affairs, l07th Cong., (July 25, 2(01) (statement of 
Bruce G. Ohr, Chief, Organized Crimes and Racketeering Section, Us. Dept. of Justice) 
[hereinafter Oversight 2001 Hearillg 011 IGRAl. 
~o AI Guart, 'Singing' Suspect May Link JUllior To Mob Gambling Rncket, N.Y. PosT, 
June 27, 1998. 
n Jus/ice Files: Watch Your Wallet (Di~overy Channel television broadcast, Aug. 13, 
2001). 
nld. 
H ld.; see Oversigll12001 Hearing ou IGRA, supra note 39, at 62-63. 
44 Indian Poker Casiuo in A riZOlla Acknowledges Hirillg FeiOIIS, PHOfNlX AsscciATED 
F'REss. fW1C 19, 1998 [hereinafter Felons]. 
45 OrwaU, supm note 17, at A9. 
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complained that "putting fe lons on a payroll invites corruption and threatens public 
safety."4/; 
C. Making Poor People Poorer. Jesse Jackson's Designation of Legalized 
Gambling as "The New Chains of Slavery"" 
After minois decriminalized casino gambling on riverboats in 1992, "a 
Chicago area-based coaJition of religious and business leaders and college 
professors"48 joined with the Illinois NAACP, whose "40 local chapters voted 
unanimously . . . to oppose expanded gambling without permission from voters."~9 
The 1995 lllinois NAACP State Chairman, David livingston, summarized that 
decriminalized ·' gambling ... [wasl unfair to minorities because gambling ads target 
them,"50 and he complained that "minorities do not get the higher-paying jobs on the 
riverboats,"5! 
In a 1999 Illi.nois speech on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Jesse Jackson 
summarized that " rt]he new chains of slavery happen to be credit cards and lottery 
tickets."S2 According to Jackson, the "key to achieving [Dr.] King' s d ream is 
' teaching our people to go fro m the lottery to the markets, from [casino1 gambling 
boats to boa rdrooms'."S3 
The gambling industry's ability to disenfranchise the best interests of 
African-American communities as well as "most" tnxpayers was exemplified in 1997 
when one Atlantic City casino indicated it would pay $55 million of the $330 million 
projected cost of a 1.8 mile tunnel and roadway to its casino.54 
Today, [Lillian] Bryant's neighborhood is the last stable, middle-
class, mostly black area in all of boom-or-bust Atlantic City. Bryant 
says she' s not against new casinos, she's against u prooting good 
neighborhoods so outsiders can pretend they' re in Shangri-La. 
"Steve Wynn must have something good on these people. The state 
is bickering about having to pay $200 million for public education 
~ FelONS, slIpra note 44 . 
~7 Bryan Smith, 'New Chams' Slmck/e Kitlg's Dream, O ·n. SUN-TIMeS. Jan. 19, 1999, a t 10 
[hereinafter Gall/blitlg's New Clmws ojS1al.'l!rYl. 
411 Heid i Hildebrand, A llfi-Gambling ForCl!s Gain Allies, HERALD & REv. (Springfield, 111. 
Bur.), M.1.y 16, 1995, a.t A3 [hereina.fter Anfi-Ga rnbling Allies}. 
49 Id.; see SlIpra notes 1-2 and accompanying texl 
50 Anti-Gall/bling Allies, supra note 48, at A3. 
51 [d. 
52 Gambling's New Clmitls ojSlauery, sup'" nole 47, a l lO. 
53 [d. 
54 Steve Lopez, Itl tile Name oj Her Failler, TIME, Ju ly 14, 1m, at4. 
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by an order of the Supreme Court, but they'll spend $300 million to 
build a private driveway for a billionaire."55 
177 
Interestingly, the state of New Jersey was reportedly p repared to exercise "eminent 
domain" throughout the black neighoorhood if landowners continued to resist 
buyout offers from the casino developers.56 
Notably, one former black City Council-member Pierre H ollingsworth, who 
helped bring casino gambling to Atlantic City in 1976-1977,57 became one of 
gambling's harshest critics d u ring the 19805 and 1990s after witnessing the 
destructive impacts of casino gambling.58 Hollingsworth indicated that according to 
many residents, the casinos transformed Atlantic City from "a slum by the sea" into 
a "a slum by the sea-with casinoS."59 
D. Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling Companies' Secrets Confirm 
Research Issues? 
During the 1996 formation of the U.S. National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission (1999 US. Gambling Commission or NGISC), the American Gaming 
Association (AGA) lobbied aggressively to eliminate all subpoena powers from the 
NGlSC.60 After successfully eliminating the subpoena power in the Senate version of 
the bill establishing the NGISC,6' the bill's chief co-sponsor, U.s. Senator Paul Simon 
(D-IlL), called a press conference and angrily demanded that the subpoena power be 
reinstated. 
Critics charge[d] that the American Gaming Association -the 
gambling lobby headed by Nevadan and former Republican Party 
Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf-succeeded in killing provisions that 
551d. 
56ld. 
:;; Seeid. 
58 SCI! Pierre Hollingsworth, Former Atlantic City Council-member, Peoples 
Conference on Gam bling: Casino Gambling's Impact on Communities (Apr. 19, 1995) (giving 
a speech in Springfield, ill. sponsored by ill. State Conference of NAACP Branches, Ill. Church 
Action on Alcohol Problems, etalia,). 
59 ld. 
60 See State lnvolvement SOllglrt in Gaming Study Bill, LWL GA~I1.!"JG & WAGERING Bus., 
May 1996, at22 (enumerating the maneuvers by pro-gambling i.nterest5 to derail the formation 
and/ o r powers of the proposed 1999 U.s. National Gambling Impact Study Commission); see 
/llso David Ferrell & Matea Gold , Casino Industry Fights all Emerging Backlash, L.A. n!.us, 
Dec. 14, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Casj,IV Backlash]. 
61 See S. 704., l04.th Congo (1995); Tile Gambti,rg Impact Study Commission Act: Hearing 
Of! 5. 704 Before tile 5. Cvmm. VII Gown/melltal Affairs, l04th Congo (1995); see also S. 1720, 103d 
Congo (1993). 
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would allow the commission to call witnesses. subpoena documents 
and study gambling's impact on other businesses. 
"1 can' t imagine a (bill) that caters more to gambling 
interests," Simon said . He said the watered-down version left the 
commission w ith little to d o besides go to the library and look up 
what's already been writtE!n.62 
While the power to subpoena documents was eventually reinstated, the power to 
subpoena casino executives and other persons to testify was eliminated from the 
powers of the N GISC.bJ 
in this context, in 1996 the former chair of the US. Commission on the 
Review of the N ational Policy Toward Gambling (1972-1976) CharlesH. Morin 
complained aggressively about the attempts by the lobbyists fOT the gambling 
industry to strike the subpoena power from the new US. National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission .6t According to Chairman Morin, "the conclusion [isl that the 
opponents of any power of subpoena do, in fact. have something to conceal, which 
again leads to the decision that it is indeed necessary."65 Cha irman Morin elaborated 
on his conclusion as follows: 
{TJhe major issue is whether or not the {newl Commission should 
have subpoena power to compel testimony and the production of 
documents. Obviously such a Commission is meaningless without 
this power, at least to the extent necessary to fulfiJJ its stated 
purpose. The 1972·1976 Commission had subpoena power and, 
because of that we never had to use it -in o ther words, when you 
have the power you w ill get cooperation.66 
In his personal capacity, Chairman Morin also provided some expert conclusions 
important to the historical record. 
With a proper m ixture of pride and modesty, I would refer you to 
the Report of the 1972-1976 Commission, WiUl specific attention to 
our recommendations concerning casinos and (tha t most cynical of 
62 Kenneth Pins, Federnl Study of Gambling's E/frcfs Shelved, Des MONES RrG., June 19, 
1996; Press Release, US. Senator Paul Simon, Simon Says Don'tSmck The Deck On GambLing 
Comm ission (ext 10, 1996) (on file with the author). 
63 Pub. L. No. 1().l..169, § 5( b), 110 Stat. 1482 (1996). 
"" Letter from Cha rles H. Morin, former Chair, US. Couunission on the Review of the 
Nalion.'ll Policy Towa rd Gambling 1972·76, to US. Representative FriUlk R. Wolf, co-sponsor 
of HR-497, the Nationa l Gam bling Impact Study Commission Act (May 7, 1996) (on file with 
Ule a uthor) (representing only " personal opinions"). 
1>5 Id. 
IIf>ld. 
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retrogressive taxation) state lotteries. As 1 have observed, if anyone 
tried to sell corporate securities with the failure to disclose material 
facts so characteristic of state lottery promotion, he wauld be sent to 
prison .... 
And so, perhaps, is casino gambling ra national problem]. 
The unavoidable dangers to the public interest in installing casino 
gambling in metropolitan areas are too obvious to ignore, and the 
1972-1976 Commission recommended that this be permitted "only in 
rare instances and extraordinary circumstances," Another in-depth 
study is certainly now called for, and I believe the results will be 
shocking.67 
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Subseq uently, the 199~1999 U.s. Gambling Commission was cTeated but without the 
power to subpoena witnesses. The Final Report of the Commission was issued in 
1999.66 
Other unsettling actions by Native American groups were highlighted in the 
1995 Wisconsin Policy Research lnstitute report on Native American casinos in 
Wisconsin that complained in its introduction that one tribe would not participate 
unless it "cou ld cOlltrol till! sh/dy and know the results in advance."60\1 Perhaps 
significantly, the only threatened subpoena by the 1999 US. Gambling Commission 
was against the US. National Indian Gaming Commission (NlGq to produce an 
agency audit, as well as background information on Native American gambling 
interests. However, the Commission determined that a subpoena would be 
ineffectual and it was not issued -although the Wall Street Journal had revealed 
improprieties at the NIGC dating back to 19%.70 
The concerns among pro-gambling interests involving subpoenas and the 
legal discovery of information was perhaps reflective of the net effects and 
consequences exemplified by the civil su it by Paula lonps against William J. 
Ointon.71 For example, the legal discovery process of information in the Paula Jones 
1994 sexual harassment suit arguably transformed a relatively insignifican t civil suit 
into the 1998 impeachment of President William]. Clinton.n Analysts might 
67 Ed. 
b!! NQSC FINAL Report supra note 17; ~ NATl GAMUlING IMPAcr 511JDY Cot.B,I'N, 
EXECliTIVESUM ..... IARY (June 1999) rhereinafter NGiSC EXECUTlVESU~t~IARYI. 
rAWlS. PoL'y REs. INSf., rupra note 28, at introduction (emphasis added). 
70 Gllmbling Moratorillm, supra note 17, The 1999 U.s. National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission in an eight to one vote "threatened ... to invoke its subpoena powers for 
the fi rst time to obtlin lndian gaming finance records" from the U.s. Nationallndian Gaming 
Commission. Commissioll WallIs ~oords, SlIpra note 17. at 1; set' also Orwall SlIprll note 17, 
at A9. 
71 Stuart Taylor. Jr .. Her elise Aglll'lIst Clilltoll, AM. LAW., Nov. 1996, at 56. 
T1.ld. 
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speculate whether the lega l discovery process in a relatively insignificant civil suit 
could reveal information strategically destructive to the entire US. gambling 
ind ustry.73 
I. Defining the Problems 
A. 21st Century Governmental Policymakers: Forgetting or Ignoring the 
Economic His tory of Gambling 
The ra pid decrim inalization of Us. gambling during the 19905 was not 
driven by economists, but rather by over $200mill ion in lobbying. campaign 
contributions, and public relations from pro-gambling interests.74 Many economists 
and members of the academic community cautioned against the governmental trend 
toward decriminalization.7!; 
Increasingly, taxpayers and businesses began to rea lize that, as Professor 
Jack Van DerSlik summarized in 1990 for much of the academic community, state-
sponsored gambling "produces no product,. no new wealth, and so it makes no 
genuine contribution to economic development."76 Business-economic history 
s upports this proposition. To paraphrase Georg Hegel's common quote, "those who 
forget the lessons of economic h istory are condemned. to relive them."71 
Despite these economic caveats, during the 19805 and 19905 the US. military 
and state and local governments appeared to forget the reasons why gambling in the 
United States was criminalized for almost 100 yea rs. Implying that the state 
constitutional safeguards against gambling were based only on some type of 
moralist movement,. pr~gambling interests denied the historical obvious.78 The 
pro-gambling interests conveniently compared the criminalization of gambling to 
the prohibition of alcohol during the 1920s. However, prohibition lasted only a few 
short years, while the criminalization of gambling lasted for almost a century. The 
criminalization of gambling activities remained practical. workable, and necessary. 
U this were not the case, gambling would have been lega lized throughout the United 
States d uring the 19305, paralleling the legalization of alcohol. The fact that 
gambling activities remained criminalized for generations stand s as testimony to the 
73 See gellerally id. 
14 See, e.g., John W. Kindt, FoJImll the MOIzey: Gamblillg, Ethio, lind SlIbprerllls, 556 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. Fbt.. &. Soc. SO. H5 (1998) [hereinafter Follow tfl(' Mollt'y); April Lynch, All 
Bets Are Off. MCJIHERJONES, Julyl Aug. 19Cfl, at 38-39 (hcrcin.,Itcr Bels). 
~ See generally NatiOflal Call1bIillg Impact & Policy Comm"1 Ad: Hearillg Oil H.R. 497 
Before the House Comlll. on till! IllliicUlry, l(},1th Congo (19J5) (hereinafter Cortgressiolllli GlI mbIi" g 
Heanllg 19951; TIll! National (mpact of Ca5ill0 Gambling ProIiferatioll: Hearing Before tire House 
Comlll. 011 5nlll1l Business, 103d Congo (1994) [herein.'lfter COllgressioJlal Gambling Hearing 19941. 
1~ Jack Van Der Slik, Legillized gllmb/illg: predatory polin), ILL issUES, Mar. 1990, at 30. 
77 JOHN BARl1..ETI, FA~auARQuOTATIONS 507 (14th ed. 19(8). 
7l! See, e.g., Casino Back1a~lI, SlIpm note 60, at A 1. 
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economic history of legalized gambling activities, creating new addicted gamblers, 
ne\v bankruptcies, and new c.rime and cOTTuption.i"I In other words, the socio-
economic costs of decriminalized organized gambling outweighed the benefits.1I} 
Furthermore, if legalized gambling actually constituted a genuine strategy 
for economic development, then policymakers should ask why gambling was not 
decriminalized during the most desperate economic timeframe in U.S. history-the 
Great Depression of the 19305. Following the logic of pro-gambling interests, 
gambling should have been decriminalized during the time-frame in which alcohol 
was decriminalized. Gambling was not decriminaJized because economic history 
clearly demonstrated that legalized gambling activities are inherently recessionary 
and can catalyze economic and social downturns. 
As Nobel-Prize economist Paul SamuelsonSI has reiterated for many years, it 
is just basic textbook economics that 
[Gambling1 involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods betvveen 
individuals, creating no new money or goods. Although it creates no 
output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources. 
When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the main 
purpose after aU is to "kill" time, gambli1lg subtracts from tile national 
i"come.a2 
Corollary principles to Professor Samuelson's observations are enumerated in the 
following analysis. 
B. Governmental Policy and the Economic Principles of Decriminalized 
Organized Gambling: Re·Educating the U.S. Public 
1. Strategic Economic Principles Governing Gambling Activities 
Governmental policymakers and the public shou ld be aware of the strategic 
economic principles governing gambling activities. These principles apply to both 
illegal and legal gambling activities-although legalized gambling activities are of 
greater impact because they are more widespread due to the governmental 
"acceptabilit}· factor" that accompanies their exercise. 
7'9 See infrallotes 83-90 and accompanying text. 
IKJ See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
SI Paul Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1970. 
82 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, EcoNm.-!lCS 425 (10th cd. 1976) (emphasis uddcd) [hereinafter 
$AMUEl.50:-J]. 
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• Gambling is inherently recessionaryS3 
• Gambling catalyzes economic downtum~ 
• VVhen "consumer dollars" become lost "gambling dollars" there is a 
negative economic mu ltiplier impacjSS 
• Gambling's socio-economic costs outweigh the benefits by 3:1 86 
• Govemment~legalized gambling is a net drain on the economy.87 
• Taxpayers/society necessarily must subsidize all gamblingS8 
• Recriminalizing gambling pump~primes the consumer economy89 
• Government~legalized gambling intensifies all of the economic 
consequences of gambling activities90 
8J For analyses of this principle, see Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995, supra note 75 
(providing economic analyses); Congressional Gambling Heari11g 1994, supra note 75 (providing 
economic analyses). For a further discussion see FLA. OfF. GoV., CASINOS IN FLoRIDA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC Al"ID 5cx:J:AL IMP ACIS (1994) [hereinafter FLA. Gov . REPoRT]; John W. 
Kindt U.S. Na tional 5erurity and the Strategic Economic Base: TIlt" BI4sinessjEconomic Im fi'lcI s of tilL 
Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 567 (1995) [hereinafter Stmtegic Economic 
Base]. See also Gambling's DestabiliUltiOIl of Financial Instihllions, supra note 15. 
81 See sources cited sllpra note 83. 
as See sources cited supra note 83. For early analyses of the potential negative 
multiplier for gambling facilities, see Paul Teske & Bela Sur, Winners and Losers: Politics, Cnsino 
Gambling, a"d Deudopmerlt irl Atlalltic City, 10 POL'YSlUI). REv. 130 (1991) [hereinafter Teske & 
Sur); CEO REroRT, supra note 4, at 49~53. See also ROBERT GooDMAN, THE LUCK BUSThlffiS (1995) 
[hereinafrer LlX:K Bl.5lNE$]. 
86 For the authoritative 2001 cost/benefit ratios of "at least" 2:1, see Earl L. Grinols & 
David B. Mustard, Business Profihlbility Versus Social Profitability: Evaluuting Indllstries with 
Ex/emulilies - The Case of Casinos, 22 MANAGERIAL & DEosrONEcoN. 143 (2001) [hereinafrer The 
Gtse of Casillos); Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Managemen t and Information Issl/es for 
Industries with Externalities: The Gtse of Casino Gambling, 22 MANAGERI.".L & DEasrON EcoN. 1 
(2001) (hereinafter The Case of Casino Gambling]. See aiw CEO REroRT, supra note4, at 64 
(costs/benefit ratio'" 2:1), For cost/benefit ratios of 3:1, see Congressional Gambling Hearing 
1994, supra note 75, at 71, 79-81 (Statement of John W. Kindt); John W, Kindt, The BlIsiness-
Economic Impacts of Licensed Casino Gamblillg in West Virgillia: Short-Term Gain but LOlIg-Term 
Paill, 13 W, VA. U. PuB. AFF. REP, 22, 23 (1996) [hereinafter Bllsiness-Economic Imfi'lclS of 
Gambling). For cost/benefit ratios greater tllan 3:1, see, for example, FLA. Q:)\'. REroRT, supra 
note 83, at executive summary. See also John W. Kindt, I/lcreased Crime at,d ugalized Gambling 
Operatiolls: The Imptlct 011 the Socia-Ecol/omics of Business and Governmenf, 30 CRIM. L. BuLL. 538 
(1994) [hereinafter Increa:;ed Crime and ugalizrd Gambling]. 
g; See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. See gel1erally John W. Kindt US. and 
Intemational Concerns over the Socia-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling: Grearer than 
the Illegal Drug Problem?, Statement to the National Gambling Impact Stu dy Commission 
(May 21, 1998) [hereinafter US. and International Costs]. 
88 For an an.'l1ysis of informational sources and data, see John W. Kindt Legalized 
Gambling Activities 1/5 Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L. REv. 889 (1995) [hereinafter Gambling 
Subsidized]. 
89 For analyses of informational wurces and data, see Strategic Economic Base, ~upra 
note 83, 567 et seq.; hrcreased Crime and Legalized Gambling, supra note 86, at 538 ct seq. See also 
John W. Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities: TIlL Issues [,woluing Market Saturation, 15 N. Ill. 
U. L. REv. 271 (1995) fhereinafter Gambling SahlratWn]; Jolm W. Kindt The Negative Impacts of 
Legalized Gambling VII Businesses, 4 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 93 (1994) [hereinafter Impacts On 
Busillesses}. 
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In depth discussions of each of these principles may be found in the source materials 
as referenced. As the 21st century continues, the economic history of U.s. gambling 
activities will impress these principles upon a re-educated public. 
2. Basic Economic Principles Governing Gambling Activities 
The basic problems with gambling activities are that they are nonproductive 
and actually subtract from other productive economic sectors. Gambling also creates 
opportunity costs plus social costs that overwhelm any illu sory benefits that 
accompany the zero-sum redistribution of wealth from patrons to the 
owners/sponso rs of the gambling. 
• Gambling creates no product91 
• Faster methods of gambling cannibalize slower methods92 
• Gambling transfers money from the patrons to the organized 
owners/sponsors of the gambling93 
• Organized owners/sponsors of gambling design all gambling along 
zero-.sum guidelines to leave the owners with the sum and the patrons 
with zero':14 
• Organized gambling must expand to survive via continual increases in: 
(1) geographic scope, (2) new varieties, (3) faster wagering methods95 
• Ad hoc gambling behveen individuals transfers wealth by c reating an 
artificial risk, but its socio-.economic impacts are minor when compared 
with organized gambling sponsored by governmental entities96 
Further analyses discussing these principles may be found in the sources specifically 
cited herein. 
3. Socio-Economic Principles Dominating the Governmental 
Interface with Gambling Interests 
<)() Fo r analyses of informational SOllrces and data, see Economic Impacts, supra note 4, 
a t 51 etseq., Strategic Ecollomic Base, supra note 83, a t 567 etseq. 
<11 See, e.g., SAMUELSON, supra note 82, a t 425. 
<r.! For analyses of informationa l sources and data, see, fo r exam ple, Gambling 
Saturatioll, supra note 89. See also John W. Kindt & Stephen W. Joy, Interflet GambliNg and the 
Destabi/izatiOlI of NalrOllal mId Illten/ationni Eco1Wmies~ Time for a Comprehensive Ban 011 Gambling 
over fire World Wide Web, 80 DENv. U.L. REV. 111 (2002) [hereinafter Destabilization of Economies]. 
9".J For analyses of informational sources and data, see, for exam ple, SA~fUELSON, Silpra 
note 82, a t 425; Camb/iug Subsidized, supra note 88. 
94 For analyses of info rmational sources and data, see, for example, COl1gressiol1al 
Gamblillg Hearing 1995, supra note 75 (statement of Williaul Jahoda); Gambling Saturatiol!, supra 
note 89. 
'l5 For analyses of informational sources and data, see, fo r example, Gambling 
Satllration, supm note 89. See also Destabilization of Ecollomies, supra note 92. 
96 For analyses of info rmational sources and data, see, for example, Col1gressional 
Camb/illg Hearing 1995, 511pra note 75; COllgressiollal Gamblillg Hearing 1994, supra note 75; 
Ecollomic Impacts, supra note 4. 
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It was difficult to find any reasonable excuse for U.s. governmental units to 
decriminalize gambling activities during the last two decades of the 20th century. 
The illusory benefits touted by pro-gambling interests were simply a reshuffling of 
money and resources w ith the owners/sponsors of the gambling receiving 
inordinate amounts of the reshuffled wealth. Some of the socia-economic principles 
dominating the governmental interface with gambling interests follow. 
• Government-authorized gambling carrnibalizes the 
non-gambling/consumer economy and its business"" 
• VVhen governments authorize, sponsor, and promote organized 
gambling, a classic "boom and bust" economic cycle is initiated9ll 
• Unless severely limited in scope, government-authorized gambling 
activities will always precipitate a "bust" in a classic "boom and bust" 
economic cycle99 
• Government-sponsored gambling will collapse unless it continues to 
expand both in: (1) acceptability via the legalization of various new 
forms of gambling and (2) accessibility via placing the gambling in 
maximum contact with large population bases100 
• As government-authorized gambling expands market sahuation will be 
approached, and the gambling will become increasingly re<essionarylOl 
• Government and private sponsors of organized gambling must lobby to 
remove prohibitions on the scope and forms of gambling or pre-existing 
gambling will stagnate and eventually coliapse102 
• Historically, gambling's expansionary needs have ultimately corrupted 
governments103 
• Public policy must be predicated on a non-gambling e<onomy, because 
the only other options with government-authorized gambling are 
'IlSee 8usiness-Eamomic Impacts of Gambling, supra note 86; Gambling Saturatioll, supra 
note 89; Impacts em Bllsinesses, supra note 89; sources cited SIIpra note 96. 
96 For analyses of informational sou rces and data, see Follaw the Money, supra note 74, 
at85; Strategic Economic Base, supra note 83. Sec also Gambling's Destabiliwtion of FinurlCial 
Institutions, supra note 15. 
'19 See sources cited SlIpra note 98. 
100 For analyses of informational SOUTCl>$ and data, Sl'C, for example, Gambling 
Sahlration, supra note 89. See also Gambling'S DrstabiliUltion of Filllmcialiustitlitious, supra note 
15. 
1m Sec sources cited supra note 100. 
HI1 For analyses of information.l! sources and data, see, for example, Follow the MOlley, 
supm note 74. &e also Jolm W. Kindt, The Failure /0 Regulate /lIe GambIillg Il1dllst-ry Effectively: 
incentives for PITpetual NOIl-Comp/imlcr, 27 S. ILL. U. L. J. 219 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling 
Industry Perpetual NOll-Compliancej; Desfabilizo.tion of Ecollomies, S1/pra note 92; Gambliug's 
Destabiliwtioll of Fillancial illstitufiOJlS, supra note 15. 
M Sre sources cited supra note 102. 
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matters of degree-from a slow to a fast gambling economy culminating 
in an economic downturn and evenh.IaI bUSt'DII 
• Saturation gambling occurs when all feeder markets have achieved 
maximized acceptability and accessibility and gambling cannot expand 
in geographic scope, new varieties, or faster wagering methods105 
• Prom a political science perspe<:tive, government-authorized gambling 
must be re-criminalized before saturation gambling occurs via 
maximized acceptability and accessihilityl06 
• Once government-authorized saturation gambling occurs, the saturated 
economy will experience a dramatic downtumlO'i 
• If government-authorized saruranan gambling occurs in an 
industrialized country, particularly the United States, the economic 
downturn will domino into the economies of the worldlOO 
To illustrate how these principles interrelate, it is beneficial for policymakers to 
visualize the gambling industry's own "feeder markets" around a gambling 
facility.l 09 
C. Illustrating the Socia-Economic Impacts of Decriminalized Gambling: 
'Why Do Gambling Interests Label Locales As "Feeder Markets"? 
To conceptualize the socio-economic impacts of decriminalized gambling, it 
is beneficial to illustrate or visualize the gambling industry's identified "feeder 
markets"l1° for a particular gambling facility, such as a casino. Gambling industry 
analysts delimit the "population markets" upon wh ich the gambling faci.lity 
"feeds" - hence the term "feeder markets." For example, the 35-mile radius around 
a casino is typicaIIy the "primary feeder market," or local market, commonly 
providing 80 percent (84 percent in IlIinoiS)111 of the consumer dollars transforming 
104 See srlpra note 102. See generally Congressil)ltal Gambling Hearing 1995, ~mpra note 75; 
COllgressioTm! Gamblillg Hearing 1994, supra note 75. 
105 For analyses of informational sources and data, see generally Gambling Saturatiou, 
supra note 89. 
10; ld.; Gamblillg Industry Perpt'fuElI NOlr-Compliallce, supra note 102; Strategic Ecol/omic 
Base, supra note 83, at conclusion. 
10'7 For analyses of informational sources and da ta, see for exam ple, supra note 106; 
U.s. and International Costs, supra note 87. 
1013 See sources cited supra note 107. See also John W. Kindt & Anne E. C. Brynn, 
Destrnctive Economic Poljaes In tile Age of Terrorism." Goverument-Sallcfiolled Gamblillg As 
Ellcouraging Tra nsboumtary Economic Rniding and DeMabilizillg NafiOlral and lufenratiOlral 
EC01lomies, 16 TEMP. [l\'T' l & Cm.W. L.J. 243 (2002) [hereinafter Gamblillg Destabiliz.ing 
Ecollomies); Gambling's Destabili::atioll of Fi nancia/lnstitutions, supra note 15. 
109 See infra note no. 
IlO See, e.g., H ARRAH's ENTERTAINMENT, INc., HARRAH'S SURVEY OF CA<;I:'<O 
ENTERT."..L"MEl\TT 20-21 (1996) [hereinafter HARRAH'sENTERTAINME"') . 
111 WrLLlAM N. THO!-.IPSON & RICARDO C. GAZEL, THE MO:-..lrrARYhfPACI"SOFRIVERBOAT 
CASL"\IOGAMBUl\'G IN lLU,,-,,OiS (June 11, 1996) [hereinafter nIOMPSC>N Ac-JOG.'\ZELJ. 
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into gambling dollars. This 35-mile radius usually equates roughly to the county in 
which the casino is located. This is the proper scope for analyzing the economic 
impacts of the casino as well as any socio-economic impacts such as increased 
addicted gamblers, business and personal bankruptcies, and crime,llZ 
The secondary "feeder ma rket" is typically a 100-mile radius around the 
casino and can indude a quasi-tourist market-although a ga mbling tourist shou ld 
not be defined as a pre-existing tourist, but a new' tourist from ou t-of-state who 
would not otherwise cross the state line if nctfar the gambling facility. 1U Generally. 
the new tourist trade must increase 50 percent for the host locale to break even. 1l4 
Othenvise. the gambling facility will be "cannibalizing" the consumer economy 
within the 35-mile radiu s. Unfortunately for state governments and the taxpayers, 
practically no gambling faci lities meet the 50 percent breakeven point. For example, 
on average in Illinois, 84 percent of the consumers entering the Tllinois casinos were 
from the 35-mile radius or were Illinois residcnts.lI5 Las Vegas was the lone 
exception with 80 to 90 percent of its gambling patrons from out-of-state. 
In a summary of a frequent gambling industry tactic, Commissioner Richard 
Leone of the N ational Gambling Impact Study Commission complained that if the 
gambling ind ustry can "keep the focus of the camera tight enough, [it1 can show 
gains lfrom gamblingj."116 However, he indicated that the view would "change as 
the camera zoomed out"n? and the socio--economic negatives would become 
apparent. Accordingly, the p rimary focus for both Ule benefits and sociCH...'Conomic 
costs of a casino should not be the couple of miles around the casino, but rather the 
35-Ulile "feeder market," and secondarily the concomitant "statewide" costs and 
benefits. 
However, the most appropriate perspective is that of the nation as a total 
economic base. From this strategic perspective it becomes apparent that the multiple 
feeder markets are only transferring wealth from the pre-exisbng consumer 
economy into the gambling establishments. These gambling venues reinvest in more 
gambling feeder markets until the economy becomes saturated with gambling, and 
the faster forms of gambling then begin to cannibalize the slower forms of gambling 
m See, r.g., Economic ImfNIcts, 5Upra note 4, at 87-95, Tables 1-3; Increased Crtml! mId 
Legil/ized Gamblillg, supra note 86; U.s. ami Intemational Costs, supra note 87. 
In Soc generally Gambling $ntllraticm, 5Upra note 89. 
m Soc, I.'.g., Prof. William Thompson.. University of Nevada at Las Vegas, Nationa l 
Coru. on Problem Gambling, Crime and Gaming Enforcement, Chair, Panel Discussion at 
Illinois State University, Bloomington-Normal, IlL (Apr. 3,1996). 
115 THOMPSON AND GAZEL, Sllpm note 111. 
1I ~ Gambling ollihe FlIlllr/.', 1'HEEcoNO!-.IlST, June 26, 1999, at 27-28. 
!17 Id. 
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- until the artificial gambling boom becomes an economic bust - pa ralleling textbook 
economic boom and bust cycles. 
II. Clarification of Coals 
A. Utilize the "Best Evidence" for Strategic Analyses Involving Gambling Issues 
The "best evidence rule" compels legal policymakers to identify the most 
au thoritative, cu rrent, and relevant information related to the issues at bar.lIs In the 
context of gambling issues, the bestevid€1lce rule requires legal analysts to scrutinize 
impeachable sou rces of information. particularly sources of information under the 
direct o r indirect financial aU Ta of pro-gambling interests. Accordingly, in the 1990s 
those groups a nd organizations identified in national press reports119 and other 
arenas as potentially necessitating scrutiny of their informational sources included, 
inter a lia : 
• The American Gaming Association (AGA), Washington-based lobbying 
group120 
• The Nationa l Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG),121 started by the 
AGA 
• The National Council on Problem Gambling (NCPC)122 
• The /oflnlal a/Gambling Shulies (since 1996)123 
118 For a classic example of informational and analytical failure. ~ Romesh Ratncsar 
&- MicJt."1.cl Weisskopf, How /lie FBI Blnu tile Case, TIME. June 3, 2002. at 24. 
119 See, e.g., Stephrn,. SimurrJa. When Cumbli/lg Cvmes Tv TowlI: How To Cover Q Higlt-
5tnkes Story, COU)M. r. REv., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 36-38 [herein .. -uter Col.Ul-.t. , . REv.]; Loretm 
Tofani, Gambling Illdllstry Seeles a W;,millg [magI;', P'HIL. .... L\lQUJRER, July 6, 1998, at Al 
!hereinafter Gambling Seeles IlIIflge); David L v.theele r, A SlIrgl;' of Research 011 Gambling 15 
Finallced in Part by tile /rldl/sfr!! II self, Q-lRON. HIGHER Eouc., Mar.5, 1999, a t A17, AlB 
[he reinafter Re5ellrch Finmlred by Ind/ls/ry). Several articles in the L.A. Times ran each day 
ix.-guming tlle week of December 13, 1998, sec for example, Matea Gold , Treatment O ptlOIlS 
Smrce for Gail/bIers, L.A. n~l.ES, Dec. 15, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Treatment Options]; Cnsillo 
BllcklaS/I, Sl/Ilfa note 60, at Al. Su 11150 Bets, sllpra note 74, at 38-39; April Lynch, Heavy Be/tillg, 
MOlliER ' ONES, July/ Aug. 1997, at 40; Brett Pulley, From Gamblillg's Regulators to Casinos' Mel/, 
N.Y. TIMES, Ckt. 28, 199ft at A 1 [hereinalteT Casinos' Menl. See generally David FerrelL IndiallS 
Hnf)t Fou lld a Bollallza III tile CasillO Busilless, L.A. TD.m:;, Dec. 14, 1998, il t A26; David Ferrell. 
livlIIg by CasillOS, Losing by CAsillOS, LA. nME5, Dec. 14, 1998, ilt A26; Matea Gold, New 
Gamblers Fllld Old Troubles, LA. TIMES, Dec 13, 1998, ilt Alb; Matea Cold &: David Ferrell. 
Gomgfor Broke, L.A. nt-rES, Dec. 13, 1999, at AI. 
12{) See, e.g., Research Financed by /ru/IIStry, supra note 119, at A 17; CasillO Backlash, sI4pra 
note 60, at Al ; Call/bUllg Seeks Image, supra note 119, at Al. 
1. 1 See sources cited 5UPfll ilOtc t20. NATLCTR.RE5PoNSIBI.E GAMING, ANt-:UAI. REPoRT 
2001, at 3-4 rhe reinafter NCRG 2001 ANNUAL REPoRT]. 
m See, e.g. , Trcat llleti/ Op/iO' IS, SlIpra note 119, at A 1; see a/50 CAsillO Backillsh, supra note 
60, at AI. 
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• The Gaming Law Review124 (a misleading title, as it has no university 
sponsorship) 
• The University of Nevada Boyd Law School and its publicationsl25 
• Organizations and trade associations associated with the gambling 
indUStry126 
While academics can and should interface with industry representatives, 
concerns have been raised about the professional distance necessary when analyzing 
gambling issues. For example, conferences and informational sources might be 
coordinated and themed by groups directly or indirectly linked to substantial 
gambling industry resources. On December 8-10, 2002, three organizations 
sponsored a conference whose subtitle admitted that "gambling and otlter behavioral 
addictions are changing the concept and treatment of alcohol and substance abuse 
disorders"l27 and whose theme stated that "[t]raditionally, substance use disorders 
have provided the model to understand non<hemical addictions such as 
pathological gambling .. .. "128 These statements were noteworthy because for years 
pro-gambling interests resisted categorizing pathological gambling as an 
"addiction." However, advertisements for the conference urging press participation 
opined that "[nJew research is encouraging the scientific community to reconsider 
the nature of addiction."l2'9 Fu rthermore, the title of the conference per se was 
perhaps revealing: "Rethinking Addiction."Bo 
Held in Las Vegas at the Mirage Hotel-Casino, whose CEO Terrence Lanni 
was a pro-gambling Commissioner on the 1999 U.s. Gambling Commission, 131 the 
"Rethinking Addiction" conference had the following sponsors: (1) the National 
Council on Problem Gambling, which received substantial financial resources from 
12) See sources cited supra note 122; sec also informational sources and data cited in 
Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 4, at 31-32; John W. Kindt, Gambling vs. The New Untouchables: 
Cred ibility Concerns for Academ ia, Criminal Justice, and the U.S. Su preme Court, Address at 
Benjamin N . Cardozo Law School, (Nov. 15-16, 1999) [hereinafte r Credibility Concerns). Sec 
generally William R. Eadington, Measuring Costs From PermUted Gaming: Col/upls And 
Categories 111 Eva/uan/lg Gamblillg's Gmsequenc£s, J. GAMBUNGSl1JDlES(forthcoming). 
m See sources cited supra note 123. 
125 John L. Smith, Professor Sees Gamers alld Hookers and Lawyers, all My, LAS VEGAS 
REv.-J., Nov. 2, 199'7; illinois Prof Takes Swing at UNLV's Law-School BId, SAN Dl:F.aJ 
UNlON-TRm., Mav 9, 1999. 
126 See silpra notes 119-21, 125 and accompanying text; see alSQ CasillaS' Mm, supra note 
119. 
127 See, e.g., NATt Crn. REsPQ,.-":5IBLE GAl\.1ING & NATL CoUNCIL PROBLEM G AIo.IBUNG, 
RE'nnNJaN"G ADDlcnO~, (Dec. 8-10, 2002) (emphasis addcd). 
128ld. 
129ld. 
l.lOld. 
B1 Sec, e.g., N CISC FlNAL REPoRT, supra note 17, at app. I (statemen t o f CODlmissioner 
J. Terrence Lanni); ser fllso CasillaS' M£u, sllpra note 119. 
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the gambling indUStry132 and whose director Keith Whyte previously represented the 
American Gaming Association, a lobbying group;l33 (2) the National Center for 
Responsible Gaming, initiated by the AGA and almost exclusively funded by a 
muitimillion-dollar-budget from pro-gambling interests;l~ and (3) the Institute for 
Research on Pathological Gambling and Related Disorders, substantially funded via 
the NCRG,135 but located at the HalVard Division on Addictions. 
Academic concerns about the conference "Rethinking Addiction" focused on 
the conflict between the conference's weD-funded theme and the prevailing 
academic trends. These concerns had been raised du ring the 19905. With regard to 
the NCRGs research.. one criticism was that it is pre-directed: "'They have an 
agenda: says Valerie Lorenz, executive director of the Compulsive Gambling Center 
Inc. in Baltimore. If the industry can say something is neurologically wrong with a 
problem gambler, 'then ifs not the casinos' responsibility', she saYS." l36 Joanna 
Franklin of the National Council on Problem Gambling summarized the research 
concerns that pro-gambling interests were "not going to fund anything that's going 
to hurt them, or that has the potential to hurt them."131 
By 2002, the independent groups p roviding valid sources of information 
included, inter alia: 
• The Institute for Problem Gambling in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, chaired 
by Professor Henry LesieurI38 
• The U.S. Gambling Institute, centered at the University of Massachusetts 
and chaired by Professor Robert Goodman139 
13:! 5ee Casino Back/aS/I, supra note 60, at A1; Treatment OptiOI/S, supra note 119, at AI. 
133 5ee, e.g., Keith S. VVhyte, Indllstry Takes Proactive 5teps to Address Problem Gambling, 
NAT'L CoUNOL PRos. C.o\. .. r6u,·>lG NE\\SLEITER, (Nat'l Council Prob. Gambling, Washington 
D.C) Summer 1998, at4 (defending the gambling industry and representing the "American 
Gaming Association," a lobbying group); see a/50, e.g., Editorial Board, GA~lING L. REV., vols. 
1-2 (listing Keith Whyte's identifier as" American Gaming Association," a lobbying group). 
J.}I NCRG 2001 ANI\'UAL RB>oRT, srlpra note 121, at 4-5. 
136 [d. at 2, 6-8. 
l3b Virginia Young, Gamblillg Addiction: A No-Will Wager: Casinos Fund Problem 
Gambling Research: Critics Worry About Thei r Infiw!nce, ST. LoUIS POST-DIsPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, 
at A9-A10; see Critics Question GIsmos' Commitment To Finding Calise of Gambling Addiction, 
ST. LoI,;15 Posr-DrsPA'lGi, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al. 
137 Casino Backlash, SlIpra note 60, at AI. 
1.38 See, e.g., Henry R. Lesieur, Pathological Gambling, Work, and Employee Assistance, 1 
J. EMPLOYEE AssISTA,,,CE REs. 32 (1992); Henry R Lesieur &: Sheila B. Blume. Tire 50lltli Oaks 
Gambling 5creen (50GS): A NI?W Instnlment for Identification of Pa/11010gical Gamblers, 144 AM. J. 
F'sYanATRY, Sept 1987, at 1184; Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, IT/surance Problems alld 
PatliologiCllI Gambling, 3 J. GA!'.ffiLL'JG BEHAV. 123 (1987); Henry R. Lesieur &: Richard J. 
Rosenthal, Paf/IO/ogiml Gamblillg: A Review of tire Literahm, 7 J. GM{BUNG STUD. 5 (19:11) 
(prepared fo r the American Psychiatric Association Task Force on DSM-IV, Committee on 
Orders of impulse Control Not Elsewhere C lassified). 
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• The Research Initiative on Gambling at the University of Illinois, 
coordinated by Professor Earl Grinolsl40 
• The Compulsive Gambling Center in Baltimore, Maryland, directed by 
Valerie Lorenz, PhD.l4l 
• The Final Report142 and the Executive Summary143 of the 1999 National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission, directed by Executive Director 
Tim Kelly, Ph.D., who was subsequently located at George Mason 
University in Arlington, Virginia and Fuller College in Pasadena, 
California 
B. Reports and Governmental Decision-making: Eliminate Methodologies 
Utilized to Justify Decriminalizing Gambling 
One flaw of gambling studies was that they often did not match the proper 
methodology to the problem. Shldies in the economic, social, and accounting/ 
finance areas might follow accepted standa rds within their respective disciplines, 
but the overa ll issues they were trying to address were interdisciplinary in scope. 
Furthermore, when making decisions with "strategic" ramifications involving 
gambling issues, government policymakers should have been utilizing the Myres 
McDougal/Harold Lasswell methodology144 or even a tess well-accepted strategic 
methodology. Instead, policymakers would often utilize limited or narrow (or even 
nonexistent) srudies to justify federal, state, and local government decision-making 
regarding gambling issues,I~5 such as the subsequently discredited Arthur Andersen 
studies funded by pro-gambling interests during the mid-l990s.Hfi These faulty 
decision-making processes resulted in the elimination of the prohibitions against 
gambling contained in the constitutions of two-thirds of the states throughout most 
of the 20th centu ry. 
Recognizing some of these analytical problems, the U.S. Congress enacted 
the National Gambling Impact Study Commissionl47 (1999 U.s. Gambling 
Commission, or NGISC) that produced a generally well-done Filial Repart!~8 and a 
13'1 Ser, e,g .. CEO REPoRT. S!lpra note 4; LUCK BL5tNESS, supra note 85. 
14(1 See, e.g .. The Case of CasillaS, supra note 86; The Case of Casino Gambling, supra 
note 86; see also NGlSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, app. VI, at l. 
141 Sec, e.g., Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994, supra note 75, at 11-14 (testimony of 
Va lerie C. Lorenz, Ph.D., Dir., CompuL<;ive Gambling Center); see a/so Valerie C. Lorenz & 
Duane E. Shu ttlesworth, The Impnct of Pathologica/ Gamblillg all TI!e Sporlse Of TI!e Gambler, 11 
J. OFCm.1MUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 67 (1983). 
142NGISC F1N,\L REPoRT, supra note 17. 
143 NGISC EXECtmVESUMMARY, supra note 68. 
144 See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
1016 [d. 
147 National Gambling Impact Study ComDlissiofl Act Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat 
1482 (1996). 
148 NGISC FINAL REPoRT, supra note 17. 
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separate Executive Srmunary.l49 However, some believed that even the strategic scope 
of the NGISC Final Report could have encompassed more issue areas. 
The Myres McDougaljHarold Lasswell methodology of "poJicy-oriented 
jurisprudence" with an interdisciplinary and legal policy interface constituted the 
best- and proper-methodology ror government decision-makers to analyze local, 
state, and particularly federal and international gambling issues,tSO Throughout the 
latter haJf of the 20th century, much of the upper echelon poLicymaking in the US. 
government, such as in the US. State Deparbnent. was predicated upon 
McDougalfLassweUian methodology and p racticed by strategic decision-rnakers.151 
Even a cu rsory use of McDougal/Lasswell methodology quickly revealed the 
strategic economic, social and governmental flaws in any policies decriminalizing 
gambling,l52 However, even when McDougal/lasswell methodology was not 
utilized, the systemic flaws in most stud ies of gambling issue areas were often 
obvious. 
III. Historical Background 
A. Gambling Studies Prior to 1995: Objective Studies Object to Legalized 
Gambling 
1.9 NGISC EXEClJITVE SuMMARY, SlIpra note 68. 
150 This particular analysis is summary in scope, but it was conceived within the 
penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell model fo r decision-making. In the areas of legal and 
government policy, which subsume strategic socic:H.>conomic and business concerns, the 
classic decision-making models were formulated by the post legal realists, in particular, 
Professor Myres McDougal ,lJld Profcs.sor Harold Lasswell who postulated a conceptual 
framework for legal decision-making in a landmark article d irected toward legal educators 
and law professors. Set Harold D. L.asswell &: Myres S. McDougal Legal Educatioll alld Public 
Policy Proftssiollal Training ill tire Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); see lliso Harold D. 
Lasswell &: MyresS. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362 (1971); 
John W. Kindt, All Alllilysis of Legal Education and Business Educatiol' Withill I/re COlliext of a 
jD/MBA Program, 31 J. LOCAL Eouc. 512,. 517-18 (1981); John W. Kindt, All Allalysis of Legal 
Educatioll alld Busilless Educat/oll Witlrill the COIl/ert of a J. D/MBA Program, 13 L.AW l'HA0iER 12, 
14-1 6 (1979); MyresS. McDougal, Jllrispnldena for a Fru Society, 1 GA. L. REv. 1 (1966). The 
decision-making concepts wh ich McDougal and Lasswell introduced were later expanded to 
include international law and US. domestic law, as these areas interfaced with "policy-
oriented jurisprudence." See John N. Moore, ProlegomellOli to tire jrlrisprudellce of Myres 
McDougal and Harold Lasswell. 54 VA. 1. REv. 662 (1968); Frederic k S. Tipson, Note, Tire 
Lasswell-McDallgal Ellterprise: TOUIard a World Public Order of Hrmlan Dignity, 14 VA. J. lNr'L L. 
535(1974). 
lSI StT sources cited supra note 150. 
1.52 See EcoTlollfic tmpacts, supra note4 (demonstrating how the "strategic e lements of 
gambling activities [negatively) imp.1.ct state and locaJ economies"); Strategic ECOllomic Base, 
sllpra note 83 (concluding that legalized gambling represents a thrmt to the strategic U.S. 
economic base and stabili ty of expectations); see fI/SO Destabilizatiou of Ecouomies, SUprll note 92; 
Gambli"g Destabillz.illg Ecol/omies, supra note 108. 
I 
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In 1994, the Economic Development Center at the University of 
Massachusetts produced the report Legaliud Gambling as a Strategy Jor ECOflom;c 
Deuelopmellll53 (U.S. Gambling Shtdy) funded by grants from the Ford Foundation and 
the Aspen Institute. The U.S. Gambling Shldy examined the existing analyses that 
purported to review the use of "legalized gambling as an economic development 
strategy."l54 Among other conclusions, the U.S. Gambling Shldy found that only one 
report by the University of New Orleans was "balanced," Ten other reports that 
were totally or largely-financed by pro-gambling interests were either " unbalanced" 
(eight reports) or " mostly unbalanced" (two reports), which meant that decision-
makers were urged to ignore those ten reports as lacking credibility,lSS 
The U.S. Gambling Study was independently corroborated by an extensive 
1994 report produced by a team of Florida economists led by Subhasis Das, Ph.D., in 
the Florida Governor's Office and titled Casinos iu Floridn: Au Analysis of tlte Economic 
mId Sociallmpactsl50 (Florida Governors Report). The Florida GoveTIIOTs Report contained 
leading-edge cost estimates, such as those involving prisons/prisoners linked to 
newly legalized gambling activities. l57 These 1994 socio-econonUc costs should 
definitely have been brought to the attention of the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) that conducted related research for the 1999 US. Gambling 
Commission. Appa rently these costs went largely unaddressed - perhaps due to an 
oversight by those advising NORC or to the misdirection of pro-gambling interests 
influencing the Comm ission's research agenda. Accordingly, several of the costs in 
the Flaridn Gouemors Report retained their va lidity into the 21st century as the only 
cost estimates in some socio-economic categories related to gambling activities. l5e 
A third 1994 academic publication was Tile Ecol/omie Impacts of [ega/iud 
Gambling Actiuitiesl~ (Eco1lomic Impacts) that was produced at the University of 
nIinois and which paralleled and largely confirmed the Florida and University of 
Massachusetts reports. Apparently, each of these studies was produced without the 
knowledge of the other two- until immediately before publication. Therefore, these 
three 1994 reports independently corroborated each other. In addition, all three of 
these 1994 reports were highly critical of the sources of information provided by 
pro-gambling interests, and these reports concluded that the socil?economic costs of 
mcro REI'ORT, supra note 4, at 68-87. 
134 Iii. 
155 Id. 
156 FLA. Gov. REPoRT, supra note 83. 
157 Su id. at 67-69. 
108 Su. e.g., itL at 71-74 (citing costs of new prisons/ prisoners caused by 1l(>V,.' 
gambling facilities). 
159 Ecollomic (mpad5, Sllpra note 4 . 
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decriminalized gambling activities ouhveighed the benefits by cost/benefit ratios 
ranging from 2:1 160 to 12:1.161 
B. Gambling Studies Since 1995: The American Gaming Association (AGA) 
Lobbying Group Finances and Searches for Credibility 
Fanned in 1995 and headed by CEO Frank Fahrenkopf, the American 
Gaming Association (AGA) was a Washington-based lobbying group financed with 
a multi-million dollar budget from pro-gambling interests. 1b2 The AGA searched fOT 
credibility to respond to academic studies concluding that legalized gambling 
activities did not constitute a valid strategy for economic development and should 
not be condoned by government decision-makers. 
Initially, the AGA promulgated a pamphlet titled Gaming Industry Mytlls 
Alld Facts whose inaccuracies were brutalized by the investigative press; for example 
The most absurd claim -made in the brochure and by the 
association's president, Frank Fahrenkopf, in a television interview 
last week - is that casinos don't cause crime. 
Explain that to the court workers in Tunica County, who 
have faced at least a tenfold increase in their caseload-1200 filings 
to 12JXJO-since the casinos opened. Though Federal crime statistics 
are not yet available, felony indicbnents for the county increased 
from 13 in 1992 to 172 in 1995.163 
Thereafter, the AGA financed an Arthur Andersen "Macro 5tudy"1~ issued 
in December 1996, that was followed by an Arthur Andersen "Micro 5tudy"165 in 
1997. In a display of lobbying power, the AGA not only reportedly tried to stack the 
1999 US. Gambling Commission with pro-gambling commissioners,l66 but also 
apparently encouraged tlle Commission to discount the three negative 1994 
academic/expert reports while accepting the two Arthur Andersen reports financed 
160 CED REPoRT, sll/ffa note 4, at 64; Ecollomic Impllcts, supra note 4, at 55-56. 88-95 
(estimating a ratio of 3:1). 
16] FLA. Gov. REPoRT, supm note 83, atexccutivc summary. 
162 See, e.g., NCRG 2001 ANNUAL REPoRT, supm note 121 . 
163 James TIlomas Snyder, CasillO Cmmty, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1996, at A25, (criticizing 
Am. Gaming Ass'n.'s 1995 pamphlet, Gtllnil]g IlIdu~fry Myths and Filets) . 
164 AM. GA.\UNG A§N.I ANDERSE,") M,\CROS1U[)Y, 5lIpm note 6. 
16.'\ Alvl. GAMING A$N./ ANDERSEN MICRO STUDY, supm note 6. For an example of the 
public relations use of the Arthur Andersen studies by the American Gaming Association, see 
Pl/lli'lg a Face 011 lite Indrlstry: Arthur Alldersen Study Shows Economic Belteftts ofCnsi,w Gaming ill 
lire Unifed S/at£s, lNSiDETHE AGA, (Am. Gaming Ass'n., Washington, D.C.) Nov./Dee . 1996. 
106 See Editorial, Gambling Payoff?, WA.'ili. Ft6T, Feb. 10, 1997, at AlB; Warren Richey, 
Allfi-Gamhlil1g Activists Wan! of Stac1.£d Commission Deck, OmrsnAN So. MOl\iTIDR, Mar. 21, 
1997,at3. I 
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by the AGA.IW' With acquiescence by some pro-gambling Commissioners on the 
NGISC, the AGA goal was generally successful in achieving prominent placement 
and NGlSC reliance on information in the two Arthur Andersen reports. l6S 
For example, in the NGISC Executive Sllllllllarylb9 the NGlSC accepted 
without contrary citations the Macro Study's conclusion that by 1996 just the 
legalized casinos a lone had created over 709,000 direct and indirect jobs and were 
paying employee wages of approximately $21 billion.l"ro It should be noted, 
however, that as early as 1992 the credibility of the reports that Arthu r Andersen 
compiled for the gambling industry were undermined by the "leaked" internal 
public relations documents of some casino companies proposing a Chicago casino 
complex. l7i These leaked documents were released by the Better Government 
Association of Chicago in 1992.tn Dated April 16, 1992,173 these documents urged 
the sponsors o f the Chicago casino complex to: 
[b]e proactive on "tax" /"revenue" issues: It probably won't be 
enough for Arthu r Andersen and Northwestem University to 
develop numbers that are "credible", although that is the essential 
first step to take. 
We must also use these stud ies to make a compelling and 
convincing case for the kind of jobs that will be created, with an 
emphasis on their "quality" and "career" potential. lU 
Despite these types of revelations, the AGA utilized and promoted the 1996 Arthur 
Andersen Macro Study in attempts to create gambling industry credibility 
cOlUltering academic studies. An article in the K(JIlSflS City Star explained the AGA's 
strategy. 
The first salvo came in a study by the Arthur Andersen &. Co. 
accounting firm, financed by the industry and made public 
[December 1996]. It found that the gaming industry created m ore 
jobs, paid higher average wages and had a g reater spinoff effect on 
,;,7 See, t.g., Credibility Concerns, supm note 123 (prt.!SI.:ntation by Prof. John W. Kind t, 
Univ. III and response by Frank Fahrenkopf, Am. Gaming Ass'n.). 
168 Set, e.g., NGISC FlN,\L REPORT, supra not(> 17, aI2-8lUl.36-37. 
16'1 NGISC EXECLmVE SuMMARY, supra nOle 68, al 4 (claiming 700,000 direct and 
indirect jobs). 
1711 Iri. (c iting to AR1HUR ANDERSE1 __ , EcoNOMIC IMPACIS OF c."SD'lO GA}'IL'IG IN THE 
UNrrEDSTATI3: VOll.i·ME l: MACRoSnJDY 8 (Dec. 1996) (709,000 d irect and ind in...'ctjobs»). 
111. BI!ITER Gov'T A.$'N., STAFF WHm: PAPER: CAsL'IlO GAMIll..lNG IN OUCAGO, app. P 
(lW2) [hereinaitcf BIm'ERGov'T A$:'I1.J. 
17.! ld. 
m id. 
m /d. IIpp. P, nt 10. 
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the economy than did similar service and entertairunent 
industries. l75 
195 
The apparent goal promoted by the AGA was to utilize Arthur Andersen's 
credibility to support the theories of pro-gambling interests. 
The Andersen study attempts to debunk critics' greatest economic 
argument against gambling: that it harms other businesses that also 
rely on consumer spending. 
But that so-called "substitution theory" of consumer 
spending "is the most ridiculous of positions taken by our 
opponents," [AGA lobbyist Frank] Fahrenkopf saidp6 
Arthur Andersen's Las Vegas office was the support for Las Vegas' chief lobbyist for 
pro-gambling interests, Frank Fahrenkopf. "Steve Corner, managing partner of 
Andersen's Las Vegas office, agrees [with Frank Fahrenkopf]. 'Ifs simply not true: 
said Comer. '(Casino gambling) has actually given back to the economy more than 
it's taken from customers' through taxes, wages, spending and capital 
invesbnent."177 By 2001 and 2002, the reported accounting and managerial scandals 
plaguing Arthur Andersen threatened. the finn with not only bankruptcy, but also 
criminal charges. 178 When combined with earlier criticisms on the two AGA-
financed Arthur Andersen reports, the 21st century scandals at Arthur Andersen 
completely undermined the AGA's attempts at credibility for the arguments of 
pro-gambling interests. 
In a 1992 proposal for a $2 billion casino complex in Chicago, Illinois, the 
a(Jeged or projected tax revenues were between $327 millionm and $500 million.. l80 
175 Rick Aim, CasillO ll/dustry Stresses Pagitive Eeol/omie Contribution: Cn"tie5 Say Latest 
Report Ignares Crime as We/I as Gamhling Addiction, K."'J\'SAS OTY STAR, Dec 7, 1996, at BI 
[hereinafter Casino Igllores Crime]. 
176 1d. 
l7i" Id. 
ml See, e.g., Ellron Corporation's Collapse: Hearing before tilt 5. Comm. on Ellergy alld 
Nahlrlll Resources, 107th Cong. (2002); Walter Hamilton & Jeff L...oeds, Illtemai Report Cites 
Extensive Abuse at EIlTon, L.A. n~fES, Feb. 3, 2002. at AI; Rone Tempest & Richard Simon, 
Emon's wy Faces Capitol Hill Hot Seat, L.A. nMES, Feb. 3,2002, at A20. 
17'l Editorial, Economically, Casillos Are a Good Bet, Q.n. TRlB., May 24, 1992, §4, at 2 
[hcreinnfter CaSi ,w5 Are a Good &t]. 
Ill) Editori.-u, Daley, Developers Raise the Stai<l!s, 011. TRiB., Mar. 26, 1992, §1, at 28 
[hereinafter Developc7s Raise the Stakes]. 
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and even up to a more unlikely $625 million to $644 mill ion.t81 This projection of 
$625 million was disseminated in what appears to be an undated (but probably the 
Fall of 1992) press release by the sponsors of the casino complex. l82 As of June 'I I, 
1992, the Illinois press w as reporting the $625 million figure. The news release was 
interesting in that it claimed: 
An economic impact s tudy conducted by Artlulr Alulersen & Co. 
concludes the proposed entertainment and casino complex will 
create up to 100,000 new jobs-37,QOO duri.ng construction and 
66,000 permanent jobs on and off-sire- and produce at least 
$625 million in new tax revenues. The shtdy further predicts the 
center will draw 10.2 m illion new tourists to Chicago each year. lID 
These numbers had increased substantially from numbers promulgated by 
gambling industry reports just a few weeks earlier. These mercurial 
numbers raising the " pubHc relations ante" were soundly criticized by 
academic analyses.11U 
IV. Trends and Conditioning Factors 
A, Basic Problems with Research on G.unbling Issues 
Regardless of the procedural and substantive issues involved in the 21st 
century scandals at Arthur Andersen. it was still useful to dissect the 1997 Arthur 
Andersen Micro Study as exemplifying the analytical problems involving gambling. 
oriented studies. 
181 In the report sponsored by the propol'ents of the casino complex, the numbers 
have to be viewed very favo rably for the tota ls to reach $500 million. Sn OifCAGO GAMING 
Co;\IM'N, EcoNOMIC AI'm OTHER IMPACTS OF A PROPCNiD GAMING, ENTERTAINMENT ."""TO H OTEl 
FAOUli' 270-71 (May 19, 1992) (prepared by Deloitte &. Touche, Chicago, IlL) [hereinafter 
PRoPOSED GAMING). The $625 mill ion to $644 million in estimated tax revenues resulted from 
severa l predictions in a report by Arthur Andersen and Company, w hich WflS sponsored by 
the proponents of the casino complex. Set Ray Long, New Cn~illo Stw/ies Bolster PredictiOl/s of 
Big Pot for City, On. 5uJ\' -1)MES, May 20, 1992, at 1, 16 [hereinafter Long]. Sn gellerally ARTHUR 
Al\DERSEN & (b., IMPACT OF 1HE PRoPosm OnCAGO ll\-n:RNATIQNAL £t..-n:RTAL~),tEJ\,. CE.-.rrER 
(1992). 
ltrZ Press Release, Chicago International Entert.'liJwlcnl Ccnter, Ncv.'s at a Glance 
(undated news release, probably Fall o f 1992) (herein..-tfter News at a G lance]. 
Ito Id. (emphasis added); SCI', /?g ., John Webber, ClliCt1go Gallfbling Plan Would Hllrt 
DmUllsliite: Expert, QuINcY HERALD-Wille (Ill), June 11, 1992, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Webber] 
(reporting the complex would " [r]aisc more than $625 million in city, county and tax revenue 
annually after the complex opens"). 
11:14 For analysis of infonnational. sources and data. sec Economic Imprlcts, 5111"11 note 4, 
at 52-56. 
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1. Follow the Money:185 Studies and Organizations Potentially Under 
the Financial Aura of Pro-Gambling lnterests1S6 
While it is possible for researchers to conduct valid studies financed by 
industries or individuals with vested interests in the outcome of the research, by the 
1990s the national press was regularly reporting that the research on gambling issues 
was fraught with endemic direct and indirect conflicts of inrerest.l8'1 By 1994, an 
article in the Columbia Jourllulism Reviewl88 was recommending that reporters and 
researchers "flat out ask [other reporters, researchers, and academics] if they make 
money off the induStry."l89 Accordingly, the first hurdle any research financed by 
pro-gambling interests must address consists of questions of the "amounts" of 
finances or resources contributed by vested interests and the "degree" of direct or 
indirect vested influences induding conflicts of interest A related concern was "the 
appearance of impropriety" -a well-known ethical standard in common law. For 
example, one can look at the way the Arthur Andersen Las Vegas office corroborated 
with the chief gambling lobbyist for Las Vegas and the gambling industry.t'Xl Given 
these trends and conditioning factors, it was almost a sine qua non research principle 
that Researchers on gambling issues should not be directly or indirectly linked by 
finances or resources to pro-gambling interests or other special interests, and should 
be encouraged even to avoid honoraria, consultant fees, and the appearance of 
impropriety. By the 1990s some researchers, such as at the University of Illinois, 
were attempting to comply with these standards. 
2. Pre-Selected Positives Mean Pre-Selected Results1 'Jl 
a. The Effects of Pre-Selected Paxameters 
When those financing research can influence or even pre-determine the 
parameters of the research, then the results can often be pre-determined. A study 
can be valid and its methodology can be sound, but if it is within pre-determined 
parameters then the study is vulnerable to being criticized as just another exercise in 
public relations for the industry. The 1997 Arthur Andersen Micro Study was 
vulnerable to this type of criticism because it only reviewed three communities, such 
as Shreveport/Bossier City. Louisiana, with regard to the impact of casinos. Even a 
layperson should recognize that those communities starting casinos would initially 
185 Scc, c.g., Follow tllC Mom:y, Sllpm note 74. 
11'<\ Sec ~upra notes 119-37 and accomp.mying text. 
187 See supra note 186; see, c.g., CasillO Backlash, supra note 60, a t A 1. 
188COLUM. j. REv ., supra note 119, at 36-38. 
ll19/d. at 37-38. 
190 See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. 
19'1 See. e.g., CasillO Ignores Crime, supra note 175. 
J 
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reflect positive economk indicators.l92 Several tables purporting to compare the 
same economic factors between the three communities lacked uniformity that made 
comparisons difficult. and it CQuid even be argued that the methodology was 
changed in analyzing the employment/unemployment tables beween the 
communities-and the outcome perhaps reflected more positively on the gambling 
interests.193 Notably, the mayor who negotiated the advent of casino gambling in 
Shreveport, Louisiana, thereafter in 1996 became a noted critic of casino gambling 
and its negative impacts. 
Former Shreveport Mayor Hazel Beard's worst fears were realized 
when she lost a relative to riverboat gambling. "1 myself had a 
cousin to lose everything and create a debt of $8O,CXX) and commit 
suicide, all because of gambling. His was at the boats," Beard said 
in . .. [an] interview. But Beard said she doesn't think Shreveport 
has "suffered enough" to vote to discontinue rive rtx:Jats in the 
Nov. 5 [1996] local-option elections.1'l4 
By comparison, a comprehensive academic study of virtually every casino 
ven ue was conducted by economists Earl Grino ls, David Mustard, and Cynthia 
Dilley. The study entitled Casinos and Crilll£l95 rev iewed every US. casino 
county/feeder market (with a few exceptions excluded by the data) with "before and 
after" analyses over relevWlt time periods. 
b. The Effects of a Pre-Selected Time-Frame 
In gambling issue areas, it was common knowledge that the advent of a 
gambling establislunent such as a casino, would bring initial short·tenn construction 
to an area as well as a short·tenn cream market interested in the new opening of the 
establishment. Therefore, "studies" by gambling industry economists to influence 
government dedsion·makers often focused on the firs t two years or on short·tenn 
inappropriate time frames; consequently they were "unbalanced" (as the University 
of Massachusetts report concluded),1'16 In this regard the Arthur Andersen Micro 
Study utilized new casino markets for its analysis and somehow avoided or 
lor. AM. GA:\UNG A5f!N./ A..'I'DEFSl1N MICRO STUDY, Sllpra note 6, at 7·11. 
1'13 Cf id. tbls. at 21, 40, 54-55. 
1\101 Scott Dyer, E.T·Shreueporl Mnyor Expects GOlllbUIIg /0 Survive Election, THE 
ADVOCATE 0Nu.'\,'E (&ton Rouge, La.). Oct. 14·15, 1996, at 1. 
195 EARL L. GruNOlS, D ,\VlD B. M 15TARD, & CYNTHIA H UNT DrLLEY, CAsINC6 ANOCruMIi 
(1999) [hereinafter C."SINC6 ANDCRlMEj. 
l%CED REPoRT, supra note 4, atexecutive summary, 68-87. 
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neglected the older casino markets.197 By comparison. Casillos and Crin/£l96 includes 
"before and after" casinos ana lyses, including both short-tenn and long-term 
impacts. CasillOS and Crime revealed that studies done in the first or second year after 
a casino opened would generally show no increase in crime, but in the third year the 
crime rate in the casino county/feeder market increased nine percent on average and 
then trended upward in subsequent years. l99 The extensive and long-term analyses 
done in CasiTWS and Crime make it academically superior to any previous report 
including the NGISC Final Report's analyses of gambling activities as they interfaced 
with crime. 
c. The Effects of a Pre-Selected Geographic Scope 
1. The Proper Scope Utilizes the Industry's Own 
35-Mile "Feeder Markel" Radius 
If pro-gambling interests can focus the geographic scope of any study to 
within a mile or a few miles o f the gambling activity, such as a casino, the limited 
scope generally influences the resu lts to reflect favo rably on economic and crime 
statistics. This problem was highlighted by NGISC Commissioner Richard Leone.200 
However, as Commissioner Leone indicated, a limited focus is invalid because the 
gambling dollars and concomitant socio-economic impacts are coming from the 
industry's own identified "feeder markets."201 Until the mid-l990s the gambling 
industry analyses, particularly those utilized to prompt govemment officials into 
licensing casinos, commonly delimited the "feeder markets" for the casinos.202 
Contradicted and embarrassed by their own "feeder market" analyses, afrer the 
mid~l990s it became increasingly difficult to find gambling interests that publicly 
identified their feeder markets. 
These feeder markets were commonly delimited as the 35-mile feeder 
market (primary geographic market) and the l00-mile feede r market (secondary 
geographic market). These feeder ma rkets revealed, for example, that the projected 
casino was designed to take monies out of the feeder markets and not drop money 
into Ule locales represented in the feeder market (other than the city hosting the 
197 A.\1. GAMING A$N./ ANDERSEN MK:Ro S11JDY, supra note 6, at 7-11 (includ ing. for 
example, Shreveport, La.); su, t.g .. CasillO 8115t, supra note 19, at Al. 
1l1li Set gtlleTallyCAsL.'Kl5MDCru~lE. supra note 195. 
l'l'lld. 
::w Set supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
ZOl See sources cited supra no~ 200. 
2I.C For examples of feeder markets, sec HARRAH's ENTERTAL~MENT. supra note 110. Se~ 
also P'RoPosEoGAMING, slIpra note 181. 
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casinO),2W Accordingly. cost/benefit analyses must be conducted with the "costs" 
calculated in the respective feeder markets as well as the "benefits," Ignoring the 
costs, or calculating the costs more restrictively than in Ule entire "feeder market" 
disproportionately reduces or eliminates the costs. Similarly, the benefits should 
focus not just on the owners of the gambling and those governments narrowly 
benefiting. buton the "benefits" as a function of the entire 3>mile feeder maIket. 
2. The Appropriate Geographic Scope: 
Basic Guidelines for Valid Feeder Market and 
Cosf/Benefit Analyses 
To be valid, cost/benefit analyses must be conducted with the "costs" and 
the "benefits" both being calculated in the same markels.204 Typically, the feeder 
market:s205 can be visualized with a casino as the focal point and categorized as 
follows: 
• The 35-mile radius feede r market (i.e., the primary feeder market), that 
usua lly equates roughly to the surrounding county and the " local 
dollars" transformed from consumer dollars into gambling dollars. 
• The lOO-miJe radius feeder market (Le., the secondary feeder ma rket) 
that usually includes the 35-mile radius "local dollars" plus those dollars 
more likely to cross s tate lines. 
• States themselves as feeder markels.2OI'i 
• International markets that basically apply only to Las Vegas (and to a 
lesser extent Atlantic City). 
For local state, and fede ral decision-makers the 35-mile feeder market is the most 
important feeder market - all of the other feeder markets are largely irrelevant. 
Publicly-released indusb')' analyses have also identified, for example, "Us. Casino 
Feeder States and Markets,"107 including charts/ tables for: (1) "Top Feeder 
States,"XIB (2) "Top]O Casino Feeder States,"209 (3) "Top Feeder tvlarkets (ADIS)"210 
(i.e., Areas of Dominant Influence as television ma rkets),2Il (4) "Top 20 Casino 
::w Compare AM. GA~(1"G A$'N./ A ... '--"DERSEN MICRQSTUDY, slIpra nok> 6, with HARRAH'S 
E.VTERTAlN\tE.'--'T, supra note 110, and PRof'csEDGAMIKG, ~upra nole 181. 
201 Of course, there are SOUle demographic exceptions where the cost geographic 
market and the benefit geographic market must necessarily differ, but these differences shou ld 
be minimized. 
;m See gem:rally H ARRAII'sENTERTAL"\!MENT, supra note 110. 
206 See, e.g., id. at 20. 
]fJl ld. at 20. 
D! ld. 
2tR Id. 
210 Id. at 21. 
211 ld. 
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Feeder Markets:'zu and (5) " Feeder Markets Gene rating More Than 500,000 
Household Visits to CasinOS."213 Of course, federal decision-makers and 
McDougaljLassweU methodologists should be focused on the entire U.s. market as 
it interfaces with the internationa l economy and strategic JXI1icy. 
3. The Gambling Industry's Lack of Documentation 
The evidence showed that to support their o pinions, the gambling ind ustry's 
economists as well as quasi-experts for the industry often cited to papers with a lack 
of fooblotes and source materials.214 Typically. the industry's analysts might have 
only a couple dozen source materials that too frequently did not even support the 
analyst's proposition. Several gambling industry analyses touted by industry public 
relations did not have a s ingle footnote or source reference.215 
The citations in the two AGA-financed Arthur Andersen reports2 16 widely 
d isseminated to the press by gambling lobbyists should be compared with the 
extensive documentation in the three 1994 academic/expert reports. These three 
reports criticized the claims of pro-gambling interests. As an example, the 1994 
Economic Impacts academic article has 290 fOOtnotes.217 Furthermore, the Mega-
Lawsuits article in Managerial and Decision Economics that generated the current 
debate in 2002-2003 has 372 footnotes. 2lS By comparison, the AGA-financed Arthur 
Andersen Macro Stu dy had 49 footnotes219 and the Micro Study had 89 footnotes.22\) 
B. Obfuscating the Obvious?: Gambling Industry-Sponsored "Studies" Often 
Contain Systemic Flaws 
1. Biased Data Result in Biased Conclusions 
In addition to other p roblems with research on gambling issues, systemic 
flaws apparent in most research financed by pro-gambling interests should be 
eliminated. Reviews of historical scenarios introduce and highlight som e of the 
system ic flaws. [n o ne historical example of studies, a $2 billion casino complex was 
proposed fo r the Chicago area in 1992. A comparison of public and intemal 
" leaked" documents reflected poorly upon the sponsors of the casino complex and 
~12 [d. 
Z13 [d. 
:!H For criticisms of gambling industry studies, see, for example, CEO RER:)RT, supra 
notc4,at68-87. 
:ns See generally Id. 
ZIt> AM. G .. \ML"IG As6'N./ A"\TOERSEN MICRO snJDY, supra note 6; AM. GAMING 
AsSN.! ANDERSEN MACRO STUDY, supra note 6. 
217 Economic Impacts. SIIPlil note 4, at nn.1-290. 
21~ Mega-Lawsuits, SliP"' note 4, at 17-63. 
219 AM. GA.\IL ... G AsSN./ ANDI!RSEN MACROsnJDY, slIpm note 6. 
220 AM. GA.\IING AsSN./ A. ... DERSllN 1I.JCROSTUDY, SlIprn note 6. 
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led to allegations that credible sources were being manipulated by pro-gambling 
interests.ZZl 
With regard to jobs, the initial estimates released by the sponsors of the 
casino complex were reported on March 26, 1992, at 10,000 construction jobs and 
20,000 permanent jobs.222 As one financial commentator in Chicago observed: 
Ten thousand ... construction jobs are supposed to be created by 
this project This rna)' very weU be true. However, we could create 
plenty of construction (and permanent) jobs by building brothels 
and opium dens. If job creation is the aim of local government, why 
hasn't the mayor proposed such a projectr-n 
By May 24, 1992, the estimated "new jobs" had grown to 38,100,224 however, 
they would not all theoretically materialize until almost a decade later in 2001.225 As 
criticism of the casino increased, the sponsors of the project continued to increase the 
"jobs ante" ITom 15,000 to 36,000 to 66,000 jobs.Z26 By November 15, 1992. during the 
fall legislative session in Illinois, the so-called "Coalition for Jobs," associated with 
the casino supporters. had raised the estimates to 90,000 jobs.227 Under the aura of 
credibility provided by support from a professor at Northwestern University and 
Arthur Andersen,:!28 the jobs estimate then rose to 1((1.000 new jobs.229 Therefore, 
dur ing approximately an 8-month time frame, job estimates ranged from 15,000 to 
l00,OOO-raising serious doubt about the credibility of the sponsors of the casino 
complex. It shou ld be noted that the entire state economy would probably have lost 
more jobs than the sponsors of the casino complex promised to create - partially due 
III (omparl' News at a G lance, supra note 182, witll BETl"rn. CoV'T As$'N. slipra note 171, 
app. P, at 10. See gtllaally BE'ITER Gov'T A<i<;'N, S1Ipra note 171. app. O. 
III Dl!VI'!lopers Raise tire Stnkes, supra note 180, at 28; st'f' 11150 Long. supra note 181, at16 
(reporting estimated creation o ( full-time equivalent employees of either 12,000 pursuant to 
the Proposed Gaming Facility Report o r 18.000 pursuant to the report by Arthur Andersen 
and Company). 
m Mark M. Quinn.. 500111 Cos's of usino Proposal An! Too HiSll, On. 5w.I-1'rMl5, 
Apr. 4, 1992, at 16. 
22> Casinos are II Good Bet, slipm now 179. at 2. 
ID PRoPOSED GAMING, sllpra note 181, at 14. 
126 BE.TTER CoV'T Ass'N. supra note 171 (personal statement from the Executive 
Dir(.'ctur). 
W See News at a Glance, supra note 182, atl. 
218 ld. 
1:9 ld. 
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to the migration of consumer dollars away from the pre-existing illinois businesses, 
as concluded. by the lllinois govemor's office.2JO 
2. Flooding the Data 
While they can be valid within their own parameters, some shtdies can 
contain much irrelevant information that " floods the data" and complicates the 
decision-malting-particularly for uninformed government decision-makers. To 
combat this problem at the fed eral level. s ince the Carter Administration (1976 to 
1980), voluminous U.S. government reports have been required to provide a 
sho rtened "executive summary." The 1999 Final RepOTtDI of the NGISC was 
accompanied by a sepa rately published Executive SI41tWUlry.232 Reports sponsored by 
pr"gambling interests, such as the Chicago interests' voluminous Economic and 
Otller Impacts of a Proposed Gamillg, Entertainment and Hotel Fadlity,m were vulnerable 
to criticisms of "flooding the data" -in part because Virtua lly no analysis was 
ded icated to the socio-economic "costs" of a Chicago casino complex. 
3. Starving the Data 
The counterpart to " flooding the data" with information extraneo us to the 
analysis is "starving the data" with a paucity of data and analysis. In the gambling 
area, a p rime example of "starving the data" is the 2001 review by the u.s. 
Department of Defense (000), titled Report on tll£ Ready Availability of Slot Mac/lines 
011 Me mbers of tll£ Armed Forces, Tll£ir Dependents, alld OtlJers23-1 (DOD 2001 Slots 
Report), that eventually reflected the obvious influence o f pro-gambling m ilitary 
interests as it was being conducted. This analysis was required by federal legislation 
after U.s. Representative Roscoe Bartlett (R·Md.)235 and other members of Congress 
became alarmed at reIX>rts that patho logical and pro blem gambling in the military 
were impacting U.s. "military readiness." In 1998, testimony before the NGISC had 
u rged more Congression al scru tiny after analysis o f the military reIX>rt, 1992 
:00 Press Release, Covcmor James Edgar, lllinois. Govemor Wams Land -Based 
Ca~inos Could Bring Crime Surge as Well as Overall Loss of Jobs and Slate Revenues (Sept. 29, 
1992) (on file with author); see, r.s., Webber. sf/pra note 183, at 1, 3. 
2.11 NGISC FINALRmuRT, Sf/pm note 17. 
m NGlSC EXECUnVESm.U.IARY. sllpra note 68. 
!3J St'f' Sf.',u.'rally PRO~GA .. \UNG. SlIpra note 181. 
l34 U.S. DEP'T OF DE:J:E, ... se,. REPORT ON 1MB EFFB:::T OF THE READY AVAlLA8ILlTY OF Star 
MAOnNES ON MEMSERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, THEIR DEPENOEN1S, AND 0rnERs (2001) 
[hereinafter OOD 2001 Swrs REPORT]. 
l35 Maura Casey. Military Stcrt t5; Gamblillg Problems Sta y Hushed Up, 'fifE D AY (New 
London, Conn.), Mar. 17, 2002, at Hl [hereina fter Casey]. 
__________ ~ ____ ~~~J 
204 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance Vo18:169 
Worldwide Survey of SlIbstance Abuse Iltfd Health BelwviOTs A mong Military PUS01l11el.'ZJ6 
This report suggested that by 1997, pathological gambling in the military had 
increased 66 percent237 from the "1991 baseline of 2.2 percent238 of military personnel. 
The report also suggested that problem gambling had increased 108 percent239 from 
a 1991 baseline of 5.1 percent.240 This equaled a combined "doubling" of military 
problems241 and $3.6 billion per year in new related costs.242 
These trends in the nu mbers were largely confirmed by the 1998 m ilitary 
report, Department of De/elise Survey of Healt/I Related Beluwiors Among Mil itary 
PersofweI.24J However, when faced with Congressional sc rutiny in 2001, the DOD 
fired the private firm hired to do the follow-up analysis. Despite potential conflict of 
interest charges, DOD assigned the project to the in-house 000 Morale, Welfare, 
and Recreation Deparlment that reviewed the $127 million per year lost by military 
persoIU1el in electron ic and video gambling devices on U.S. military bases and 
faci1ities.144 
The legislative intent was for the DOD to research new data and to 
fo llow-up the 1992 and 1998 data analyses.245 Instead, the ooD review in 2001 
basically performed no new s tudy to confirm or deny the pathological and problem 
gambling trend s identified as problematic in the 1992 and ·1998 reports.246 The 2001 
ooD review "starved the data" and was only th irteen pages - an obvious 
whitewash of projected p roblems among military persoIU1el and military 
read iness.m It was also interesting why an apologist for the gambling industry, 
William Eadington, would be motivated on his own to affirm this thirteen-page, 
conflict of interest, in-house 2001 report and imply that it was the final answer 
delimiting that there were insignificant numbers of military personnel w ith 
23t> NATL TEcH. IJ\'FORMA1l0N SERVICE. US. DEJ"T OF Cm.t ,w ,;,,'CE, 1992 W ORLD\\TOE 
SURVI!Y OF Sl,.-i3STANCE Ai3U5E AND H BALTH BEHAVlORS AMONG M1LrrARY PERsoNNEL 12-14 to 
12-30 rhereinafter Mn..rr MY PERsoNJ',,'EL 1992 REPoRT]. 
2J7 US. and Intemationa l Costs, supra note 87, at tb l. 11 and accompanying footnotcs. 
~ MIl.lTARyP'F1!SoNNEt 1992 REPORT, supra note 236, at12·1 4 to 12-30. 
D9 US. and International Costs, supra note 87, at tbl. n and accompanying footnotes. 
~010 MnJTARY PERsoNNEL 1992 Rf.f'ORT, supra note 236, at 12-14 to 12-30. 
2-11 US. and lntemational Costs, Slipra note 87, at tbll1 ru"KI aa::ompanying footnotes. 
212 [d. 
243 RoBERT M. BRAY lIT AL., 1998 DEPARTMENT Of DEFe.~SB SuRVEY OF HEALlli RELATED 
BEHAViORS A:-'10NG MIurARY P'ERSoI\Tf\"'a (1998) [hereinafte r DOD 1998 IiEALni AMONG 
MU .. 1TAF:Y). 
24< Ca..o;;ey, supra note 235, at HI. 
2~5 [d. 
2'61d. 
mId. 
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pathological and problem gambling hahitsHS- when the more in-depth and 
complete 1992 and 1998 reports suggested othenvise.24\1 
4. Misdirecting or Unreasonably Focusing on Procedure 
After the reported "intervention" of the AGA's chief lobbyist Frank 
Fahrenkopf,250 the National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG) that was 
primarily funded by pro-gambling interests251 awarded a $140,000 grant to a study 
group headed by Howard Shaffer,2.52 The resulting Harvard Addictions Meta-
anaJysis253 has much to commend it, but it could be criticized as unnecessarily 
procedurally complex and difficult to read. The hvo chief criticisms of the Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analysis were: (1) that despite subsequent requests, the study 
apparentJy did not report the baseline numbers of pathological and problem 
gamblers for the 120-152 studies analyzed254 -a regular and fairly simple 
procedure- that wouJd allow for confirmation of the srudy's numbers,255 and (2) the 
study proposed a confusing and entirely new nomenclature of "disordered 
gambling"2.'i6 instead of the American Psychiatric Association's established 
nomenclature of "pathological gambling" and concomitant "problem gambling" 
pursuant to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.257 
2.t.8 See Eadington, MA.NAGERIAL & DEasION EcoN. (forthcoming 2003); see also Liz 
Benston, Expert: Problem Gambling Study FllTlWd, L....s VEGAS SUN, Mar. 31, 2003 (slating th.1.t 
William Eadington has " long been c ritical of social cost studies that [professor William] 
Thompson has cond ucted for ... states grappling with how to measure the effect of legalized 
gambling"). 
2'9 See supra notes 234-43 and accompanying text. 
250 Sec, c.g., Casi ,1O Backlash, s!lpra note 60, at AI. 
251 NCRG 20tl1 ANJ\'UAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 4-5. 
252 Casino Backlash, sllpra note 60, at AI. 
m HOWARD J. SHAFFER, lIT AL., HARVARD MEDICAL 5c:HOOL, ESllMATING THE 
PR£VALENCEOF DI~RDERED GAMBUNC BEHAVIOR L'J THE UNITED ST,\Tffi AA'D CANADA: A META-
ANALYSlS43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16, (1997) [hereinafter HARVARD ADDlcnONS META-ANALYSIS] 
(calcu lating .5 percent of the U.S. popu lation or l.5milhon new pathological (addictL>d) 
gamblers created by lega Lized gambling between 1994 and 1997); see Press Release, Harvard 
Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of Ganlbling Disorders 
in North America, (Dec. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis Press Release] 
(reporting that from .84 percent, "the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-199'7 
grew to 1.29 percent of tile adult population"). 
254 Sec, e.g., Megll-Lawsllits, SlIPrll note 4, at nn.I63-168, 190, 215-218, and 
accompanying text 
!55 Id. 
256 Sec, e.g., HARVARD AoolcnONS META-ANAL'rSIS, supra nOIe 253, at 1, 9. See also 
Harvard Addictions Meta-.ma lysis Press Release, supra note 253. See generally AMERICAN 
GAMING AsSN., A DJSCUSSION OF DI90RDERED GAMBLING & RFsPoNSmLE GAMING (1997) 
[herein.1.ftcr AM. GAMING Ass'N. DIsoR.DIlREDGAMBUNC]. 
'lSi AMERICAN PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIsnCAL MANUAL Of ME.."\ITAL 
DISORDERS, 615-618, § 312.21 . 
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Reminiscent of President Ointon's famous but unsuccessful equivocation 
that " it depends on what the meaning of the word ' is' is,"256 by 1999 Howard Shaffer 
was equivocating "when is pathological gambling, pathological gamblingf'2S9 
Shaffer also apparently suggested that there were increases in the numbers of U.s. 
pathological gamblers during the 1990s because after people sought assistance for 
their gambling problems clinicians were "teaching them that they have an 
addiction."260 
5. Borrowing From the Tobacco Industry: Using Legal Discovery to 
Distract Public Opinion 
In a surprising development, in 1996 tobacco interests launched a bold new 
defensive strategy to the states' tobacco lawsuits. They targeted the gambling states 
with a publ ic relations/ legal counter-attack predicated on "accusing state officials of 
promoting gambling. Such an activity, they say, can lead to a va riety of economic 
and social problems, including ' addiction: Cigarette lawyers also suggestfed that 
s tates were) ... hypocritical in accusing their industry of targeting minors, while 
permitting gaming interests to do exactly that"261 In a case of first impression in 
Minnesota, tobacco lawyers filed discovery requests with s tate officials "to provide a 
massive amount of documents (on gambling) and the problems it ... [had caused], 
which allegedly include[d] the creation of a new class of addicts, an increase in 
bankruptcies and the spread of crime."262 The tobacco lawyers obviously saw 
parallel arguments that made the states look hypocritical in pursuing tobacco 
interests while exempting gambling interests. The scope of the tobacco lawyers' 
requests for information was instructive. 
Among other things, (tobacco} industry iaVv")'ers . . asked for 
documents about whether or to what extent ga.mbling is "an 
addiction" and imposes costs on society; Minnesota's marketing and 
public relations strategies and its expenditures for advertising of the 
state lottery; the effects of lottery advertisi.ng on minors; the state's 
238 KEl\'f\"'ETH W. STARR, Om:cr OF n-lE i.NoE:J>a..:DE.vr CouNSEl.., TRAI\,:SClUPT OF 
PRESlDE.vr WILUAMa.t....-ro:-tS VIDBJTAPIlT:EsnMOI\'Y"TOTHEGRANO JURY, (Aug. 17, 1998). 
2309 Howard J. Shaffer, Slrnl'gr Bedfelhr<l1S: A Critical VI~V of Patlwlogicnl Gamblillg alld 
Addictioll. 94 J. ADoicnON 1445 (1999) (manuscript supported in part by a grant from 
pru-grunbling interests, the National Center for Responsible Gaming. a center almost entirely 
fundl'l..i by pro-gambling interests). 
U(I Id. 
261 L.A. Times Staff, Tobacco Lawyers Use Gambling a~ DiversiQII, DosroNGLOBE, Nov. 7, 
1996. 
W id. 
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efforts to discourage gambling by minors; state revenues from 
gambling; and state expenditures to help "problem gamblers."263 
207 
The tobacco lawyers' requests for information were designed to develop 
impeachment of any state's case, according to an attorney for one tobacco company. 
"The strikingly close parallels betw"een the state's criticisms of defendants' sales of 
cigarettes and its own conduct in advertising and profiting from gambling may 
make discovery into that area perfectly appropriate to develop impeachment and 
rebuttal evidence ... ,"264 The Minnesota scenario involved not only requests for 
discovery of information from state officials, but also from healthcare plaintiffs such 
as Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota.265 This "gambling as diversion"21111 strategy 
by the tobacco companies during the 19905 was eventually unsuccessful both in 
Minnesota and throughout the United States, but parallel strategies could easily 
reappear in the 21st century as new data becomes available. 
V. Policy Alternatives and Recommendations 
A. Congress Should Re-Criminalize U.s. Gambling to Pump-Prime the Short-
Term Economy and Revitalize the Long-Term Consumer Economy 
The federal re-criminalization of U.s. gambling activities throughout the 
Un ited States would pump-prime the consumer economy out of any economic 
malaise by transforming "lost" gambling dollars into consumer dollars.267 For 
example, in 2002 approximately $55 billion in gambling dollars (with a multiplier, if 
any,266 of approximately 1.7209 equaling $93.5 billion) would pump-prime the 
economy by being transformed into $55 billion in consumer dollars (with a standard 
economic multiplier of 2 to 3, or $110 billion to $165 billion).270 Thus, the consumer 
dollar may have as much as twice the value of the gambling dollar. U.s. economic 
history demonstrates that the re-criminalization of gambling activities was beneficial 
to the U.s. economy for almost 100 years -and from a practical standpoint, the 
criminalization of gambling activities was workable and largely enforceable.271 
Furthermore, re-criminaJizing gambling would largely eliminate the negative "crime 
U3 rd. 
2601 rd. 
W Id. 
266 Id. 
2/;7 See supra notes 81-117 and accompanying text. 
26S See supra notes 76-77, 81-90 and accompanying text. 
1#! See generally Don Phares, TL"Stimony before the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission, Chicago, Ill., (May 20, 1998) (testifying that the net multiplier fo r Missouri 
casinos was 0.94 with a range of 0 to 1.79). 
270 See slJpra notes 81-117 and accompanying text 
271 See SUl'fII notes 74-82 and accomp."lflying tex t. 
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multiplier" which posits that every $1 in gambling benefits leads to $3 in socio-
economic costs.m 
Perhaps more importantly, the energy. intellect:,. and entrepreneurial 
"opportunity costs" that are now lost to the non·productive promotion of gambling 
would largely be redirected into the long·term US. consumer economy.2'73 This 
could have positive economic ramifications for the rest of the world since much of 
the international community emulates or tries to em ulate U.s. econ omic and social 
policies.ZJ4 
B. Congress Should Transform Re-criminalized Gambling Facilities into Long· 
Term Educational and High-Tech Research Facilities for Both the U.S. Public 
and Native American Tribes 
In the early 19905. the Nebraska legislature rejected casinos for Nebraska-
even to save the supposedly " beloved" Aksarben racetrack. instead, the legislature 
essentially bulldozed the track and transformed its land and remaining 
infrastructure into collegiate facilities and a high-technology research park. Thus, 
the legislature: (1) eliminated the racetrack's gambling that "cannibalized" the 
Omaha consumer economy. (2) prevented an intensification of this economic 
cannibalization that would have been the result of a transfonnation of the racetrack 
into a casino, (3) de facto pump-primed the Omaha economy by eliminating the 
racetrack/ casino, and (4) planned for long-tenn econo mic progress by transforming 
the gambling facilities into collegiate and high-tech facilities. 
The Nebraska example typifies a policy of re-criminalization that would 
work on the national level for both state-sponsored and Native American gambling 
facilities. T he U.s. Congress should retu rn the country to the policy upheld for most 
of the 20th century by r~riminalizing all U.S. gambling. Congress should then 
transform gambling facilities into educational and high-tech facilities. Converting 
oubnoded facilities into educational and high tech facilities is a long-standing 
practice stil l \videly in use-after US. hosted World's Fairs and O lympic games, and 
similar short-term events, the facilities, residence halls, and restaurants have been 
transformed into research, consumer. high-tech, and collegiate facilities. for 
example, the 1996 Olympic Village and restaurants in Atlanta were transformed into 
residence halls and cafeterias (or the Georgia University system. The negative 
economic and social consequences of legalized gambling activities as detailed in the 
m &c supra note 86 and accompanymg text. 
2:'3 Set', eg., Us. and International Costs, supra note 87; see Illso Impt1d $ 0 11 Busillesses, 
supra note 89. 
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1999 US. Gambling Commission's Finn! Report275 easily justify the re--criminalization 
of all US. gambling activities. In fact,. the US. Gambling Commission may be 
among the leaders of such a movement-in 1999 its members unanimously called for 
a moratorium on the expansion of any type of gambling anywhere in the United 
StatesP6 
C. Academics, Researchers, and the News Media Should Critically Examine or 
Avoid Infonnation and Publications from Sources That May Be Directly or 
Indirectly Linked Historically to Pro-Cambling Interests 
First and foremost, it is vital to critically examine and appropriately discount 
any information and publications from sources that are directly or indirectly linked 
to pro-gambling interests. As the 21st century began, the more obvious potential 
direct and indirect links of informational sources to pro-gambling interests became 
more obscure and subtle. Accordingly, the history of potential conflicts of interests 
needs to be highlighted for researchers who may naively assume that particular 
informational sources are valid on their face-without bothering to "fol1ow the 
money. These issues involving the impeachment of informational sources are 
particularly relevant with regard to the legal process of infonnation discovery. 
Researchers and reporters should specifically and directly question sources 
as to whether they receive direct or indirect "financial or resource assistance" from 
pro-gambling interests, as well as to the degree of assistance they receive. In 1994 an 
article in the Columbia JouY/la/ism Review277 ra ised issues involving the direct and/or 
indirect financial links between academics/experts and pro-gambling interests.Z"73 
Thereafter, several national news sources raised similar issues involving potential 
financial conflicts of interest.279 In the 1990s a historical plateau was reached that 
necessitated that academics, researchers, and the news media pointedly ask aU 
sources of information whether they receive any direct or indirect "financial or 
resource assistance" from pro-gambling interests (or other special interests) and the 
"degree" of any financial assistance. This policy must be continued in order to 
ensure unbiased presentation of the information pertinent to the gambling debate. 
D. Paralleling the Tobacco Cases of the 19905, Pro-Gambling Interests and 
Infonnational Sources Should be Identified and Prevented from Suppressing 
Research and Studies 
273 NGISC FNAL REPoRT, ~lIpm note 17. 
276 Id., at introductory letter by NGISC Olair, Kay C. James. 
277COLlJM.]. REV., 5!lpra note 119, at 36-38. 
278 Id. 
m See srlpra notes 119-26 and accompanying text. 
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With regard to the difficulty of publishing the theory underpinning the 
mega-lawsuits against the tobacco companies, it is interesting and somewhat 
disturbing that 
Although the theory developed by Ray Gangarosa, with support 
from Brian Willis and . . . [professor Frank Vandall] is part of the 
theoretical development that led to the largest settlement in the 
history of the world, ... several elite law reviews rejected the article 
before it was accepted by Fordham . ... 28) 
[Thereafter] no hospital administration journal offered to 
fe-publish the article in any fmID. It is a challenging question of 
American politics why these hospitals, which had been paying 
billions of dollars in tobacco-related expenses, would not want to 
bring suit and why tlteir joltrrtals would 1Iot mentioll tile article iu allY 
way, slwpe, or form .2S1 
These authors in the tobacco scenarios also identified financial conflicts of interest 
that may have suppressed republication of their law review article from Fordham.282 
With regard to pro-gambling interests, it was entirely foreseeable that a parallel 
scenario could arise in the future. Only through careful vigilance and increased 
academic interest can such an outcome be prevented. 
E. Academics, Researchers, and News Personnel Should be Alert to the 
Subtleties of Apologists Defending Pro-CambIing Interests 
In 1998 Professor Meir Gross of the University of Massachusetts published a 
comprehensive article, Legal Gamblillg as a Strategy for Economic Develapment in the 
ECOl/omie and Developmwt Quarterly (EOC).283 This article concluded that legalized 
"gambling is problematic and not a substitute for sustainable economic 
development"284 and complained that proponents of more legalized gambling 
activities "often rely on economic studies sponsored by the industry."285 
Summarizing several academic studies, including an analysis by the Federal Reserve 
280 Ray E. Gangarosa, et aI., Stlils by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the 
Trcalmellt of Disease, II/jury, and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORillIA)-.,IURBAN LJ. 
81 (1994). 
281 Frank ]. Vanda ll,. The Legal Theory tmd tll£ Visionaries TlUlI Led to tlu: Proposed 
$368.5 BilliOlr Tobacco Settlement, 27Sw. U. L. REv. 482 (1998) (emphasis added). 
282 See, e.g., id. at 482 n.70. 
2l!3 Meir Gross, Legal Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Droelapmell/, 12 EcoN. DEY. Q. 
203 (1998) [hereinafter Economic Development] . 
2&1 Id. at 203. 
285 Id. 
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Bank of Boston, Professor Gross concluded U(t]here is no evidence that gambling 
brings new money into the economy."286 
Assistant Professor Douglas Walker of Georgia College wrote a three-page 
"Response" that was induded afler the EDC 3rtic1e,237 that in turn was followed by a 
"Rejoinder" from Professor Gross,288 
Mr. Walker's short critiques demonstrated a pattern of piggybacking on the 
agenda of pro-gambling interests in criticizing first the EOC article by Professor 
Gross and more recently another article, TIle Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Slwuld tile 
States IlIih'ate Mega-LmvsIIits Similar to tile Tobacco Cases!Z'l9 (Mega-Lawsuits) published 
in the 2001 edition of Ma'UlgeriaJ alld Decisioll Economics (MDE).Z'90 Assistant 
Professor Walker again generated his criticisms a lthough he was not cited in either 
of the articles he criticized. 
These types of concerns also raise a rhetorical question: If authors could 
publish in a un iversity-related academic journal, why would they choose to publish 
in the "non-university sponsored" Gamillg RevieuiJ91 or !01l rnal ofGambliTlg Stlldiesrm 
These concerns were particularly relevant as those publications were re;:?rlitorially 
configured from 1997 and into the 21stcentury.293 
VI. Conclusion 
For most of the 20th century gambling was criminalized throughout the 
United States-and criminalization worked. The U.s. Congress shou ld re-
criminalize gambling activities, a policy that would: (1) eliminate socio-economic 
taxpayer costs of $3 for every 51 in new tax revenues; (2) pump-prime the short-term 
economy via an economic multiplier effect, infusing the consumer economy with as 
much as $110 billion to $165 billion; (3) stimulate and "stabilize" the long-term U5. 
economy by eliminating recessionary gambling influences; and, (4) send constructive 
policy signals to the international community which largely emulates or is 
influenced by U.s. economic signals. 
:8/t Id. at 208. 
2S7 Douglas M. Walker, Response: Comment (In Legal Gamblillg as a Sfraftgy for Ern/lomle 
DrJt'/opmellf, 12 EcoN. DIN. Q. 214, 214-16(1998) [hereinafter &sponsel. 
::8!1 Meir Gross, Rejolllder: Response to a Com me/If Ott "Legal Gall/bUttg as a Straftogy for 
Eeol/o/me Droelopmmt/' 12 &0:-0. DEY. Q. 217 (1998) [hereinafter ReJOlllderJ. 
:::H Mega-LawsUIts, slIpra note -:I; see also 8enston, slIpra note 248 (noting that in March, 
2003, to critique a study by Profesoors William Thompson and Keith Schwer, "the Nevada 
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290 See geljrTfllly 22 M ANAGERIAL & DEClS10N &::oN. 1 etseq. (2001). 
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After US. hosted World's Fairs and Olympic games, and similar short-term 
events, the facilities have been transformed for research and collegiate purposes. 
Similarly, both Native American and state-sponsored gambling activities couJd be 
transformed into research, consumer, high-tech, and collegiate facilities, generating 
long-term economic growth and stability. 
On May 21, 1998, CEO Frank Fahrenkopf of the American Gaming 
Association called a press conference at the Chicago hearing of the 1999 US. 
Gambling Commission to launch an umbrella attack on the credibility of several 
academics, including some of the academics then in Chicago to testify before the 
Commission.294 Despite the presence of many national media representatives, 
apparently no media carried Fahrenkopfs "conspiracy theory" -except the Nevada 
press. The gambling industry, pro-gambling interests, and their public relations 
publications should neither be allowed to dictate the parameters of the debate nor to 
misdirect the issues entirely. 
By the advent of the 21st century, it was apparent that the critical analysis of 
legalized gambling issues, unfettered by pro-gambling interests or other special 
interests, was essential to the economic health of not only the United States, but also 
the international community. The re-criminalization of gambling activities appeared 
to be the long-term strategic solution to fostering greater economic and societal well-
being throughout the world community. The re-criminalization and suppression of 
government-sanctioned gambling needed to occur to counter the socio-economic 
negatives occasioned by the historically recent trends in the 1980s and 1990s toward 
legalizing various gambling activities. Despite well-financed initiatives designed to 
protect gambling interests and despite blistering public relations attacks by 
gambling lobbyists against well-intentioned government officials, gambling 
activities needed to be re-criminalized and otherwise suppressed. Faced with 
intensely debated public issues, Abraham Lincoln summarized the historica l 
dilemma for government officials: 
If the end brings me out aU right, what is said against me won't 
amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels 
swearing I was right would make no difference.295 
294Frank Fahrenkopf, CEO, the American Gaming Ass'n., "Con.'lpiracy Theory" Press 
Conference, State of Ill. Bldg., Chicago, III (May 21, 1998). 
295president Abraham Lincoln in a conversation at the \-Vhite House, JOHN BARTlETI, 
FA1IIlIARQuOTATIONS 641 (Emily Morison Beck ed., Little, Brown & Co. 19(8) (1919). 
